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ON THE ELIMINATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES:
A THEORY OF GOOD FAITH FOR
UNINCORPORATED FIRMS
Andrew S. Gold*

Post-Enron, it might seem strange to relieve the managers of a
business from their fiduciary duties. In fact, Delaware limited
partnerships and limited liability companies ("LLCs") are now
permitted to completely eliminate fiduciary
duties.'
And, contrary
•
2
to recent commentary, this option is desirable.
Eliminating fiduciary duties is preferable for some business
relationships as a means to allocate risks before disputes arise.
Judicial error, with the moral hazard that it encourages, has real
costs when it comes to an optimal exercise of business judgment. If
the parties to an agreement conclude that they can better manage
the risks of opportunism within their business than the courts-i.e.,
that the costs of judicial oversight exceed the benefits-fiduciary
duties are a potential obstacle to their goals.
Given the option of eliminating fiduciary duties, the question
becomes, what duties are left? Some contend that fiduciary duties
are contractual in nature and subject to extensive modification.3
Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. The author
would like to thank Stephen Siegel, Michael Jacobs, Matthew Sag, Tonja
Jacobi, Gordon Smith, Arthur Gold, Estella Gold, and participants in DePaul
faculty workshops for helpful suggestions. The author would also like to thank
Lacie Kaiser for her excellent research assistance. Any errors are the author's
own.
1. See DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c) (2005).
*

2. Cf. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual
Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and

Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1620 (2004) ("Ultimately,
the wisdom of the contractarian vision of corporate law, and its influence on
business culture, may well be questioned in the wake of the Enron debacle and
subsequent accounting scandals.").
3. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 1-39 (1991); Henry N. Butler & Larry E.
Ribstein,

Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A

Response

to the Anti-

Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993) [hereinafter
Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty].
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Fiduciary duties are often defined as hypothetical bargains between
the parties to an agreement, reflecting the terms the parties would
have adopted if they had foreseen the dispute at issue.4 Others
claim that fiduciary law should include mandatory standards of
conduct. 5 Even without fiduciary duties, however, contractual
obligations still remain.6 These residual obligations are the focus of
this Article.
Delaware recently amended its Limited Liability Company Act
and its Limited Partnership Act to allow the elimination of fiduciary
duties owed to members of the firm and to the firm itself.7 This
4. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra

note 3, at 431 ("A court setting out to protect principals from their agents must
use the hypothetical contract approach; the only alternative is to injure the
persons the rule makers want to help."). There is some dispute within the
contractual understanding as to when a hypothetical bargain analysis is
appropriate. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 17 (supporting a
contractual understanding of fiduciary law, but contending that it is "a mistake
to identify the hypothetical bargain approach with the contract theory of the
corporation").
5. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989);
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,

1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988) [hereinafter DeMott, Beyond Metaphor]; Claire
Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, FiduciaryDuty

& Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955 (1995); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (1989); Scott
FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303
(1999); Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations,138 U. PA. L. REV.
1675 (1990). See also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)

("Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating
erosion' of particular exceptions.").
6. For discussion of good faith requirements in place of fiduciary duties for
LLCs, see Deborah A. DeMott, FiduciaryPreludes:Likely Issues for LLCs, 66 U.

COLO. L. REv. 1043, 1057-62 (1995) [hereinafter DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes];
Miller, supra note 2, at 1643-45. In the limited partnership context, see Larry
E. Ribstein, FiduciaryDuties and Limited PartnershipAgreements, 37 SUFFOLK
L. REV. 927, 938 (2004) [hereinafter Ribstein, Limited PartnershipAgreements].;
see also J. Dennis Hynes, FiduciaryDuties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom

of Contract, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 46-49 (1995) (discussing good faith
requirements for partnerships); Larry E. Ribstein, FiduciaryDuty Contracts in
Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 544, 583-84 (1997)
[hereinafter Ribstein, Unincorporated Firms] (discussing good faith for
unincorporated firms); cf Coffee, supra note 5, at 1664-65 (describing
contractual duty of good faith as a limitation on corporate waivers of fiduciary
duty).
7. The new provisions allow fiduciary duties to be "expanded or restricted
or eliminated" by provisions in the parties' agreement, provided that the
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legislation clarifies the right to entirely remove fiduciary duties for
these business entities.8 Fiduciary duties for Delaware limited
partnerships and LLCs are contractual default terms, subject to the
parties' decision to opt out of their ambit. 9
As a result of these changes, correctly interpreting limited
partnership and LLC agreements as a matter of contract law will
grow in importance. Limited partnerships and LLCs are frequently
formed in Delaware, ° and Delaware shows the potential to acquire

agreement "may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith
and fair dealing." See Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005) (permitting elimination of fiduciary
duties for limited partnerships); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005) (permitting elimination of fiduciary duties
for LLCs). Each Act will be referred to as the "DRULPA" and "DLLCA",
respectively. The amendments in both cases were effective August 1, 2004.
Although the statutes are distinct in many respects, both statutes contain
nearly identical language respecting contractual modifications, and the
Delaware courts apply the same principles of interpretation to both entities. Cf.
Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999) (citing
authority on contractual freedom within limited partnerships as applicable in
an LLC case); see also Joseph L. Lemon, Just How Limited Is That Liability?:
The Enforceability of Indemnification, Advancement, and Fiduciary Duty
Modification Provisions in LP, LLP, and LLC Agreements in Delaware Law, 8
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 289, 312 (2003) ("Elf Atochem illustrates the congruence

of Delaware courts' interpretation of Limited Liability Company law with that
of Limited Partnership law.").
8. See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d
160, 167-68 (Del. 2002) (casting doubt, in dictum, on the idea that fiduciary
duties for a limited partnership could be eliminated under prior law). Compare
Miller, supra note 2, at 1640 ("Based on the principles enunciated in Gotham
and Omnicare, and the similarity between Delaware's limited partnership and
LLC statutes, one would expect that the Delaware Supreme Court will not
permit a broad and/or complete elimination of fiduciary duties in the LLC.")
with

Ribstein, Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 6, at 959

("Delaware law, while not taking contractual freedom to its theoretical limit,
permits a significant amount of flexibility.").
9. See Kahn v. Icahn, No. CIV. A. 15916, 1998 WL 832629, *2 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 10, 1998) (describing these fiduciary duties as defaults). This contractual
resemblance is not solely limited to the ability to modify fiduciary duties, but
also exists in terms of negotiation. See Ribstein, UnincorporatedFirms, supra
note 6, at 550 ("The antiwaiver argument is a harder sell in most closely held
unincorporated firms in which terms are often negotiated or voted on face-toface and approved unanimously. Fiduciary waivers in unincorporated firms
closely resemble the sort of 'real' contracts that anticontractarians have held
out as models in the public corporation debate.").
10. See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships:A Study in
Freedom of Contract, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 363, 370 (2002) ("Although

systematic data are not yet available, evidence suggests that venture capital
contracts are routinely organized under Delaware law, and that such contracts
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jurisdictional dominance here, akin to its role in corporate law.1 1
Whether or not the Delaware model gains popularity in other
jurisdictions, Delaware's explicit allowance for eliminating fiduciary
duties formally changes the business structures available to
investors. 2
The contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing is especially
important in this context. Delaware law leaves intact the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for firms that choose to
eliminate fiduciary duties. 13 Indeed, contractual good faith is
mandatory under the new statutory provisions. 14 Accordingly, some
portion of traditional fiduciary duties could be preserved through
the enforcement of good faith duties.
Yet the statutes also provide that limited partnership and LLC
agreements should be interpreted "to give the maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of...
agreements." 5 This policy qualifies the available meanings for
contractual good faith-the good faith mandate should be
make use of the law's flexibility to waive many of the default duties that
otherwise would apply.").
11.

See Jack B. Jacobs, Entity Rationalization:A Judge's Perspective, 58

Bus. LAw. 1043, 1044 (2003) (describing proliferation of alternative entity cases
in Delaware); see also Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1236,
n.37 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("[Plarties, otherwise unwilling to shoulder fiduciary
burdens, maintain the opportunity to form limited partnerships precisely
because the parties can contract around some or all of the fiduciary duties the
general partner typically owes the limited partners."); Kahn, 1998 WL 832629
at *2 ("This flexibility is precisely the reason why many choose the limited
partnership form in Delaware.").
12. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the Delaware Limited
Partnership and its Implications for Corporate Law, 16 J. CORP. L. 299, 302

(1991) ("Because contractual freedom has been accepted in the limited
partnership, no theoretical justification exists for refusing to extend it to the
corporation.").
13. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6 §
18-1101(c) (2005) (allowing for the elimination of fiduciary duties for these
entities "provided that the . . . agreement may not eliminate the implied
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing."). Another provision under
both statutes provides a defense against fiduciary liability where there is good
faith reliance on contractual provisions. § 17-1101(e), (f); § 18-1101(d), (e). Bad
faith, in this context, has been interpreted by the Delaware Supreme Court to
require a "tortious state of mind." See Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley
Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 (Del. 1993). However, the
defense only applies where the agreement is found to be ambiguous. See Cont'l
Ins. Co., 750 A.2d at 1240 (Del. Ch. 2000). On the interaction of the good faith
reliance provision with contractual good faith requirements, see DeMott,
FiduciaryPreludes,supra note 6, at 1050.

14. § 17-1101(d); § 18-1101(c).
15. § 17-1101(c); § 18-1101(b).
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understood in terms of contractual freedom. In tandem, good faith
and contractual freedom determine what obligations remain when
fiduciary duties no longer control the contracting parties'
relationship.
Under freedom of contract principles, good faith functions as an
interpretive doctrine, not as a source of mandatory obligations."
Rather than mandating standards of business conduct, good faith
terms are implied in light of the explicit text of an agreement, as an
interpretation of the text.
Good faith duties are therefore
contractual gap-fillers: they are a means of filling in implied terms
where the contract is silent as to specific contingencies." In those
cases where contracts do not expressly address a future contingency,
good faith doctrine looks to enforce the parties' reasonable
expectations based on the text of their agreement. 8
Thus, the crucial good faith inquiry is whether contractual text
fully addresses the exercise of discretion at issue. In some cases,
discretion-granting terms are quite broad. A limited partnership or
LLC agreement may, and often does, provide individuals with
absolute discretion over the management of certain firm decisions.
Such grants of discretion are rational choices for some businesses,
especially venture capital firms. 9 When they are sufficiently clear,
these terms also implicate the scope of good faith duties.
Contracts are drafted to resolve a variety of concerns, including
the concern that courts will intervene in the parties' business
relationship. 20 Typically, when fiduciary duties are eliminated, the
scope of managerial discretion will be limited by the parties (or, in
cases of contractual silence, provided by default terms). But barring
egregious
cases,
such
as
unconscionability,
fraud,
or
16. David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate
Fiduciary Law: A ContractarianApproach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 499-500

(2004).
17. Id.
18. See Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75
IOWA L. REV. 861, 869 (1990) (stating that "[iun every contract there is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing," and that good faith should be
'understood with attention to the intention of the parties and their reasonable
expectations") (internal citations omitted).
19. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 10 (describing reliance on contract
law and extrajudicial constraints in venture capital context). As Rosenberg
notes, the fiduciary waiver "permits the venture capitalist to conduct his
business with the kind of broad authority needed to function in his multiple
roles as company officer, advisor and source of funding." Id. at 382.
20. On the use of contractual language to alter the course of future
litigation, see generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Principles of
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006), available at
http:llssrn.com/abstract=722263.
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misappropriation of assets, contract doctrine mandates few
21
restrictions on the discretion of non fiduciaries.
Courts usually interpret contracts with the object of enforcing
the parties' intentions when they signed their agreement. Once
fiduciary duties are eliminated, however, judicial efforts to construct
a hypothetical intent for unforeseen contingencies are highly
speculative. Aside from contractual absurdities, the most reliable
indication of intent in this context is the explicit text of the
agreement. The text is the means by which the parties chose to
memorialize their understanding. Notwithstanding the contractual
duty of good faith, this text need not reflect external norms of
business conduct.
A strict adherence to contractual text permits agreements that
do not resemble classic fiduciary relationships. Removal of fiduciary
duties thus allows for a de facto expansion of business-judgmentrule protections by altering the underlying standard of conduct.22
Under the new laws, contracting parties have the ability to
substantially restrict the scope of judicial oversight by adjusting
their default obligations to the firm and to their business partners.23
As will be developed below, these broad grants of discretion are
consistent with legitimate business purposes and should be
respected under principles of contractual freedom.
The first three Parts of this Article offer an analysis of current
Delaware law in light of judicial precedent. Part I of this Article
provides an overview of fiduciary duties and the implied contractual
covenant of good faith, and Part II reviews the history of fiduciary
opt-outs for Delaware limited partnerships and LLCs. Part III
reviews the implied covenant of good faith as it is enforced in
Delaware. This Part explains how good faith is best understood as
21. An example of a mandatory contract doctrine is the requirement of
consideration. Cf. DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes, supra note 6, at 1060-61
(suggesting the contract doctrine of consideration limits the scope of fiduciary
waivers absent a robust good faith duty).
22. The contractual provisions at issue address standards of conduct,
rather than standards of review. However, where fiduciary duties such as the
duty of loyalty are removed, they have a consequent impact on the scope of
judicial oversight. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of
Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 437
(1993) (describing a divergence between fiduciary duty as a standard of conduct
and the business judgment rule as a standard of review). It is also arguable
that substitution of contractual duties in this context might remove businessjudgment-rule protections in some cases. See Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E.
Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable Decisions: The Business
Judgment Rule in UnincorporatedBusiness Organizations?,30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
343 (2005).
23. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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an interpretive measure rather than a source of mandatory
substantive duties.
The remaining Parts of the Article address contract doctrine
generally and seek to demonstrate that Delaware courts'
understanding of contractual good faith is appropriate in this
context. Part IV assesses the meaning of contractual gaps and
describes how a decision to eliminate fiduciary duties and avoid
judicial oversight is consistent with a rational effort to allocate risk.
Part V discusses the content of judicially implied terms in the
context of fiduciary opt-outs. This Part will argue that judicially
constructed hypothetical bargains are not a reliable method for
determining the parties' intent in cases of fiduciary opt-outs,
supporting the view that courts should strictly follow the objective
meaning of contractual text. Part VI suggests that an expansive
role for good faith doctrine is unnecessary to protect most parties to
fiduciary opt-out agreements.
Part VII discusses the import of contractual freedom when
courts interpret agreements that displace fiduciary duties. This
Part will contend that, in order to avoid redistributing preexisting
contractual commitments and ensure the greatest breadth of
contractual choice, courts should strictly enforce limited partnership
and LLC agreements, even in cases that significantly restrict the
judicial role. The effect of strict enforcement of the text would
permit substantially more freedom from judicial review than is
available under traditional fiduciary relations.
I.

DEFINING FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH

Contracts that eliminate fiduciary duties still retain residual
good faith obligations. In order to make sense of good faith and fair
dealing obligations for agreements that have eliminated fiduciary
duties, one must first define these concepts. 24 The basic scope of
these doctrines is set forth below, with emphasis on the similarities
and distinctions between fiduciary duties and contractual good faith
duties.

24. As the focus of this Article is the effect of good faith doctrine on
contracts that have eliminated fiduciary duties, it is beyond the scope of this
Article to define precisely the circumstances that cause fiduciary duties to come
into existence. There are several explanations which might fit comfortably with
the analysis in this Article. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract &
FiduciaryDuty, supra note 3; D. Gordon Smith, The CriticalResource Theory of
FiduciaryDuty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, The Structure
of the Fiduciary Relationship (2003), http://home.law.uiuc.edu/-ribstein/
structureofthefiduciaryrelationship9.doc.
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A.

The FiduciaryDuties of Loyalty, Care,and Good Faith
Limited partnerships and LLCs both implicate fiduciary duties
for managers of the firm.25 A limited partnership has many of the
characteristics of a general partnership, albeit with several unique
features. Limited partners have limited liability, and are passive
members of the firm,26 while general partners are personally liable
for the limited partnership's obligations and have active control over
the business. 7
In contrast, LLCs generally offer default
management by the firm's owners,28 though it is possible to
structure the LLC so that it is controlled by a group of managers.2 9
In each case, common law fiduciary duties govern managerial
discretion. °
Fiduciary duties generally arise where one party is given
32
31
discretionary authority over property or a "critical resource"

owned by another party. In broad terms, the fiduciary must act
selflessly and in the best interest of the beneficiary. 3 These
obligations are commonly viewed as implied contract terms
governing a party's discretion.34

25. For a useful comparison of the two business forms, see Ribstein,
Limited PartnershipAgreements, supra note 6, at 931-32.

26. See id.at 931. Limited partnerships are also characterized by finite
duration. On the significance of this aspect for venture capital, see Rosenberg,
supra note 10, at 378-79.
27. See Ribstein, Limited PartnershipAgreements, supra note 6, at 931.
28. See id. at 932.
29. See id.

30. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 388-89 ("Under common law, as
well as the uniform partnership laws in most states including Delaware, the
general partners in a limited partnership owe a fiduciary duty to the limited
partners in much the same way that corporate officers owe a duty to
shareholders.").
31.

See Ribstein, The Structure of the FiduciaryRelationship, supra note

24, at 8 (describing fiduciary duty as a contractual term which applies "where
an 'owner' who controls and derives the residual benefit from property delegates
open-ended management power over property to a 'manager'"). Not all fiduciary
relationships involve property in the standard sense. For example, fiduciary
claims based upon the taking of confidential information do not implicate
traditional concepts of property. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract &
Fiduciary Duty, supra note 3, at 435 (critiquing a property-based definition of
fiduciary duties).
32. See Smith, supra note 24, at 1403-04 (explaining fiduciary theory in
terms of critical resources, including confidential information).
33. See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 5, at 882 ("The fiduciary's
duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further
the beneficiary's best interests. The fiduciary must avoid acts that put his
interests in conflict with the beneficiary's.").
34. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract & FiduciaryDuty, supra note

20061

ELIMINATION OFFIDUCIARY DUTIES

If there is a residual duty of good faith in agreements where
fiduciary duties are eliminated, it must be substantively distinct
from fiduciary duties, at least in some cases.
Otherwise, a
contractual clause eliminating fiduciary duties would be illusory,
and the recent statutory amendments would be meaningless. When
locating a distinction between fiduciary duties and good faith duties,
it is helpful to compare the standard content of fiduciary duties with
that of contractual good faith duties.
Delaware courts describe a triad of fiduciary obligations: the
duties of loyalty, care, and good faith. 5 There are a variety of
explanations for this set of duties, ranging from contractual
36
analysis, to the view that these obligations have ethical and moral
underpinnings.37 Some commentators allege that fiduciary duties
are (at least partially) status-based, mandatory obligations that
exist whenever certain types of relationships exist.38
Given the statutory backdrop at issue here provides a right to
eliminate fiduciary duties, a contractual default theory provides a
better descriptive fit than a theory of mandatory duties. 39 The
3, at 436 ("No noneconomic rationale does very well at explaining even the
outlines of fiduciary duties. The implied contract approach can and does.").
35. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) ("The
directors of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due
care, loyalty, and good faith."); see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del.
1998); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
36. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 28-30; Easterbrook & Fischel,
Contract & FiduciaryDuty, supra note 3.
37. Cf.DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 5, at 879 ("Applicable in a
variety of contexts, and apparently developed through a jurisprudence of
analogy rather than principle, the fiduciary constraint on a party's discretion to
pursue self-interest resists tidy categorization."). But cf. Smith, supra note 24,
at 1400 (attempting to provide a unified theory of fiduciary duty).
38. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 801
(1983) ("[Fliduciary relations combine the bargaining freedom inherent in
contract relations with a limited form of the power and dependence of status
relations."); Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A Response
to Professor Hynes, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 70 (1995) ("I view the
partnership relation as fundamentally one of status, with contractual
bargaining at the periphery.").
39. This aspect of fiduciary duties, and more broadly, business entities, has
not always been apparent. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1485-86 (contending
that the theories of the corporation as a nexus of contracts, and of corporate law
as a standard form contract, are "descriptively erroneous"). The ability to

adjust the internal governance terms for Delaware limited partnerships and
LLCs is pervasive, however. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d
286, 290 (Del. 1999). In addition, even if the agreement is similar to a form

contract, this need not vitiate consent. On the merits of enforcing form
contracts, see generally Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002) (contending that form contracts can be seen as
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duties themselves are clearly defaults under Delaware law,4' and the
new statutory language limits the right to opt out of fiduciary duties
pursuant to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.4 1
This Article will therefore discuss fiduciary duties as default duties,
subject to modification by agreement.
The fiduciary duty of loyalty is often described as a duty of
unselfishness.42 Judge Cardozo famously described this duty in the
joint venture context as "[nlot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive"" and noted that the duty required
"something stricter than the morals of the market place."" This
understanding of the duty of loyalty means that a managing
member of a limited partnership or LLC would owe the other
members, or the entity itself, a strict duty not to act contrary to
their interests.45
The duty of care requires that the business manager follow a
decisionmaking process that is not grossly negligent and consider all
material information that is reasonably available. 4 It has been
suggested that the duty of care is not "distinctively fiduciary," since
similar duties exist in other types of contracts.4 ' Even so, the duty of
care is traditionally grouped under the category of fiduciary duties,
and parties to a limited partnership or LLC may eliminate it from
their relationship under Delaware's new statutory provisions.
entirely legitimate under a consent theory of contract).
40. See Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge, 750 A.2d 1219, 1235 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("In
the limited partnership context, Delaware law resolves this conflict in favor of
contract law, rendering fiduciary duties default rules.").
41. The statutes are explicit that the "agreement may not eliminate the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 17-1101(d); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (emphasis added). This
makes clear that the good faith duty at issue is grounded in contract law.
42. See Ribstein, UnincorporatedFirms, supra note 6, at 542.
43. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, 2000 WL 1277372, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug.
31, 2000) (finding that managers on LLC board owe a duty of loyalty); In re
Boston Celtics Ltd. P'ship S'holders Litig., 1999 WL 641902, at *4 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 6, 1999) (stating that general partner duties to limited partners are "no
less than that owed by a director to a shareholder,").
46. See, e.g., In re Caremark International Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
970-71 (Del. Ch. 1996); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
The duty may also apply in cases where the fiduciary acts contrary to the
interests of the business entity, but does not actually act out of self-interest.
See Smith, supra note 24, at 1410-11 n.46. This type of breach could also be
described in fiduciary good faith terms, however.
47. See id. at 1409 (noting that a duty of care exists within nonfiduciary
relationships); DeMott, Beyond Metaphor,supra note 5, at 915 (same); Ribstein,
The Structure of the FiduciaryRelationship,supra note 24, at 15.
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The fiduciary duty of good faith is a source of potential
confusion. This area of the law is still developing, and the doctrine
may have different meanings in different contexts.48
It is
questionable whether a fiduciary duty of good faith is not simply the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a fiduciary
setting, 4' and courts differ in interpreting this obligation as a
distinct fiduciary duty.50 For purposes of clarity, this Article will
refer to "fiduciary good faith" when addressing the good faith duties
that fiduciaries owe and "contractual good faith" when addressing
the duty of good faith that inheres in contracts generally.
The Delaware Supreme Court views the fiduciary good faith
duty as a freestanding fiduciary duty that can be violated
independently from a violation of the duties of loyalty or care."
Although the precise meaning of an independent fiduciary duty of
good faith is not yet fully clear, this duty may cover instances where
a fiduciary acts egregiously, intentionally abdicating their
obligations in ways that do not implicate gross negligence or
conflicts of interest. 2 For example, where a duty of candor is
intentionally violated, without the existence of a conflict of interest,
this could be a breach of the fiduciary's duty of good faith. 3

48. For a thorough analysis of recent fiduciary duty of good faith decisions
in Delaware, see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
456, 463-82 (2004). One reason for the recent emphasis on this branch of
fiduciary law may be the effect of Delaware's exculpatory provision for corporate
directors, which permits directors to avoid liability for duty of care violations,
but not for loyalty or good faith violations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7) (2001).
49. See Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 513 ("There is no line connecting good
faith and fiduciary duties. Rather, good faith is a circle around which all duties,
corporate or contractual, are surrounded.").
50. Put simply, duty-of-loyalty violations are not in good faith, nor is the
gross negligence that comes with a breach of the duty of care. The role for a
free standing fiduciary duty of good faith depends, then, upon forms of bad faith
that are neither disloyal nor lacking due care. Sale suggests that nonprocedural flaws in decision making that do not implicate conflicts of interest
are an example in this category. See Sale, supra note 48, at 494.
51. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A2d. 85, 90 (Del. 2001) ("The
directors of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due
care, loyalty, and good faith.").
52. See Sale, supra note 48, at 494 ("The value of a separate good faith
duty, then, is in its potential for addressing those outrageous and egregious
abdications of fiduciary behavior that are not simply the results of bad process
or conflicts."). For a recent judicial effort to define fiduciary good faith duties,
see In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. CIV. A. 15452, 2005 WL
1875804, at *36 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005). The Disney opinion emphasizes intent
as a requirement for good faith violations. Id.
53. See Sale, supra note 48, at 492. However, Sale's definition arguably
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B.

The Implied Covenant of Good Faithand FairDealing
Fiduciary duties exist along the same continuum as contractual
duties of good faith and fair dealing.'
They are depicted as
5
variations on a theme, or distinguished "with a blur and not a
line."56 Overlap between these doctrines is unsurprising since both
types of duties seek to prevent opportunism where a contract is
silent."
As a practical matter, the difference between fiduciary duties
and terms implied under the contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is the scope of the obligation."
Fiduciary duties
depends upon the content of the duties of loyalty and care. See Rosenberg,
supra note 16, at 508-09 (noting as an example that Sale contends that a failure
to comply with one's fiduciary duties is likely to result in a breach of good faith).
The strength of Rosenberg's argument is contingent upon how strictly one
confines the meaning of due care or loyalty.
54. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 5, at 991-93. Dickerson contends that
"[tradition and formalism alone defend the current view that fiduciary duty
and good faith are wholly separate concepts." Id. at 993. She argues that the
same concerns with power and conflicts of interest that call for fiduciary duties
also call for good faith duties, and the distinction is purely one of degree. See
also Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract & Fiduciary Duty, supra note 3, at 438

("When transactions costs reach a particularly high level, some persons start
calling some contractual relations 'fiduciary,' but this should not mask the
continuum."); Smith, supra note 24, at 1488-89 (comparing good faith and
fiduciary duty in terms of the "range of opportunistic behavior possible in each
context"); cf. Coffee, supra note 5, at 1653 ("Suppose one were to start with a
devil's advocate assertion that the core fiduciary duties of corporate law are
essentially context-specific applications of contract law's duty of good faith
55. Smith, supra note 24, at 1487-88 (describing contractual good faith
duties as a loyalty obligation and contending that "[fliduciary duty and the duty
of good faith and fair dealing are variations on a theme").
56.

Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract & Fiduciary Duty, supra note 3, at

438.
57. See id; see also Mkt. Street Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595
(7th Cir. 1991) ("The concept of the duty of good faith like the concept of
fiduciary duty is a stab at approximating the terms the parties would have
negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have given rise to their
dispute."). But cf. Smith, supra note 24, at 1492 ("That parties to a fiduciary
relationship define the contours of their relationship through contract does not
mean that fiduciary duties are simply contractual gap-fillers. As emphasized
repeatedly throughout this Article, the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty
holds that fiduciary relationships are distinctive.").
Even from a noncontractual perspective on fiduciary relations, the two doctrines are easily
linked. Cf. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 5, at 892-902 (comparing the
two doctrines).
58. See Frey, 941 F.2d at 595 ("This duty [of good faith] is, as it were,
halfway between a fiduciary duty (the duty of utmost good faith) and the duty
merely to refrain from active fraud. Despite its moralistic overtones, it is no
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generally require a rigorous standard of behavior, precluding
managers from acting in their own interest in place of the interests
of the business entity. 59 Like fiduciary duties, contractual good faith
duties also reject opportunism; unlike fiduciary duties, they do not
preclude selfish behavior. 6°
Under a contractual good faith
standard, a party with discretion may act in her own self interest, so
long as she does not abuse this discretion in a way that is contrary
to the spirit of express contractual obligations.6'
The content of contractual good faith has not been easy to define
in the abstract,
in part because context is so significant to its
•
62
application. The scope of good faith duties and the circumstances
under which they apply vary with the terms of each agreement.
Differences in interpretive philosophy also impact the meaning of
contractual good faith.
An early contribution to the debate over this duty provided a

more the injection of moral principles into contract law than the fiduciary
concept itself is.").
59. See generally DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note

5, at 882

(discussing general principles of fiduciary relationships). As Gordon Smith
notes, there is some overlap even here. Smith, supra note 24, at 1409-10 ("In
the fiduciary context, the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to adjust her
behavior on an ongoing basis to avoid self-interested behavior that wrongs the
beneficiary. By contrast, the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
requires loyalty to the other contracting party only to the extent that the terms
of the contractual relationship reasonably contemplate the actions in question.
Stated another way, both contracting parties and fiduciaries may be allowed to
engage in self-interested behavior.").
60. See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor,supra note 5, at 900 ("Most importantly,
if a fiduciary obligation constrains a person's discretion in a particular matter,
the obligation is breached if the person acts self-interestedly. Good faith
obligation, on the other hand, permits actions that are self-interested; the key
question is abuse, not benefit to the actor."); Coffee, supra note 5, at 1658 ("In
contract law, a discretion-exercising party may often act in a self-interested
fashion. Good faith and self-interested behavior are not mutually exclusive.
Conversely, fiduciary duty's requirement of undivided loyalty permits the
fiduciary to consider only the beneficiary's interests."); see also DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor, supra note 5, at 882 ("The fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness
and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the beneficiary's best interests.
The fiduciary must avoid acts that put his interests in conflict with the
beneficiary's.").
61. See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 5, at 900 (discussing example
of a requirements contract where the buyer can make profit-maximizing
decisions).
62. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 201, 206

(1968) (contending that "good faith" does not have a general meaning, but takes
on a specific meaning in a particular context).
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list of categories in which courts found "bad faith."6 3 Robert
Summers contended that the phrase "good faith" was an "excluder,"
which could not itself be clearly defined, but could be recognized by4
those instances when the absence of good faith is found.
Categories of bad faith conduct include evasion of the spirit of the
deal, lack of diligence and "slacking off," willful rendering of only
"substantial" performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, abuse
of a power to determine compliance, and interference with or failure
to cooperate in performance by the other party.65
Summers also proposed that the duty of good faith contains a
moral component, suggesting that it is in a category of doctrines
which create liability "independent of contract." 66 Good faith is,
under this theory, "a piece with explicit requirements of 'contractual
morality' such as the unconscionability doctrine and various general
equitable principles. 67 As a result, the text of a contract might
actually conflict with the good faith duty. This latter thesis proved
controversial.
Good faith conduct is generally understood in light of the
parties' agreement. As one critic of Summers' thesis noted, "it is
hard to see what justifies a court in disregarding the agreement of
the parties on grounds of 'contractual morality' when the intentions
of the parties or their reasonable expectations can be reasonably
ascertained," and doctrines such as unconscionability are not
invoked.6" If one seeks to have maximum freedom of contract, which
is the express interpretive guidance of the applicable Delaware
statutes, the ability of moral concerns to trump contract terms is
problematic.69
An additional concern raised by Summers' understanding of
63. Id. at 232-43.
64. Id. at 201.
65. Id. at 232-43.
66. Id. at 198 (providing examples such as fraud, negligence, and estoppel,
and noting "[t]hese doctrines supplement, limit and qualify specific legal rules
and contract terms, and some of them also serve as substantive bases of liability
independent of contract").
67. See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 811 (1982)

(describing good faith under Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts in these terms).
68. See Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performanceof a Contract:A
Reply to ProfessorSummers, 69 IowA L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1984).
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
18-1101(c) (2005). Good faith, even as an interpretive measure, can have an
impact on freedom of contract, see infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text, but
it need not do so. Viewed as an affirmative limit on the availability of contract
terms, however, it is hard to see the consistency with individual autonomy.
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good faith is that it does not provide a unifying theory for when good
faith is violated that can be readily assessed ex ante by the
contracting parties. ° The excluder analysis focuses on cases of "bad
faith," without sufficient emphasis on what qualifies as "good
faith.

7

'

This is not to say that good faith is a model of predictability

under other definitions: it is, however,
especially hard to define ex
2
ante under an excluder approach.1
Steven Burton suggested an alternative understanding of the
duty of good faith, in an attempt to provide a model that would
better aid analogical reasoning. 3 Under his formulation, a violation
of the duty of good faith occurs when a party to a contract attempts
during the course of the contract to recapture an opportunity
foregone at contract formation.7 '4 Bad faith is found when discretion
is used to recapture such opportunities-a refusal to pay "the
expected costs of performance. '" s Good faith, in contrast, is found
when a party's discretion is exercised "for any purpose within the
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation."76
Good faith analysis then raises two questions: (1) "what was the
discretion-exercising party's purpose in acting?" and (2) "was that
purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties?"77 This
theory permits a contracting party to perform in ways contrary to
what the promisee had subjectively hoped for, but not if doing so

70. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contractand the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369, 369-70 n.5 (1980) ("No effort is
made to develop a unifying theory that explains what these categories have in
common. Indeed, the assertion is made that one cannot or should not do so.").
71. See Burton, supra note 68, at 508 ("My principal difficulty with
excluder analysis is its singular focus on cases of bad faith. Most of the relevant
performance cases hold that a party acted in good faith ....
One need not
develop a 'positive definition' to consider analogically whether a particular case
is more like those precedents finding good faith performance or more like those
finding bad faith performance.").
72. Cf. id. at 509 ("To say, for example, that one should consider 'all things'
in a case, as Professor Summers advocates, is of limited practical utility. ...
We want our language to call our attention to the facts that matter-those that
legitimately establish significant similarities with or significant differences
from the precedents."); see also Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of
Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 120 (1998)
("Professor Summers sees no real meaning in good faith as such. Rather, he
sees the concept as something of a safety-valve, allowing the courts to police
agreements and performance for fairness.").
73. See Burton, supranote 68, at 509-11.
74. Burton, supra note 70, at 385-87.
75. Id. at 387.
76. Id. at 373.
77. Id. at 386.
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interferes with what the parties objectively contemplated.78 As
noted, the foregone-opportunity theory eschews reliance on
questions of "contractual morality," instead looking to the
expectations of the parties in light of the promises in their
79
agreement.
A textually grounded explanation is set forth in Kham & Nate's
Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. FirstBank.8 ° In that opinion, Judge Easterbrook
addressed good faith duties in the context of a bank's refusal to
advance funds to a shoe store under an agreement that expressly
permitted the bank to cease making advances. 8 In light of the
contractual text, good faith conduct did not require an advance. The
court explained that "'[glood faith' is a compact reference to an
implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way
that could not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and
which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties. 8 2
Good faith is thus a contractual gap-filler where the agreement
is silent, but the possibility of finding gaps is limited by explicit
text.83 Under this reading, the principles of good faith "do not block
use of terms that actually appear in the contract,"' and parties may
enforce negotiated terms "to the letter."8 5
This formulation

78. Id. at 391-92 ("[TIhe relevant and distinct set of facts is that subset of
the totality of the circumstances (1) at formation, bearing on the expected costs
to a discretion-exercising promisor; and (2) at performance, bearing on whether
the promisor exercised its discretion in performance to recapture a foregone
opportunity. That the dependent promise did not receive benefits under the
contract as it had hoped simply is not dispositive.").
79. The sources of the expectations-whether they are located solely in the
text, or should be based on a broader context-are not agreed upon. See, e.g.,
Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1256-57 (1999).
80. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
81. See id. at 1353-54.
82. Id. at 1357.
83. See id. ("When the contract is silent, principles of good faith.., fill the
gap.").
84. Id.
85. Id. ("Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them
to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading partners, without
being mulcted for lack of 'good faith.'"); see also L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec.
Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) ("More often than we care to recall, we
have reminded litigants that ... [they] may not seek to litigate issues of 'good

faith' in lieu of abiding by explicit provisions of contracts."); Kham & Nate's, 908
F.2d at 1357 ("[Klnowledge that literal enforcement means some mismatch
between the parties' expectation and the outcome does not imply a general duty
of 'kindness' in performance, or of judicial oversight into whether a party had
'good cause' to act as it did. Parties to a contract are not each others'
fiduciaries; they are not bound to treat customers with the same consideration
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emphasizes predictability.
Kham & Nate's is an example of good faith viewed as an
interpretive measure, with no room for implied terms where express
terms are clear.87
Good faith duties only address contractual
language where the parties have left something unresolved; their
contract must in some sense be incomplete.88
Pursuant to this
understanding, a discretion-granting term is viewed as complete,
without gaps, except when the intent of the parties could not
reasonably be read to permit the exercise of discretion under
dispute.
As the above examples indicate, there is disagreement over the
precise meaning and source of "good faith" duties. Delaware case
law, however, supports the idea that good faith duties must be
understood in light of the parties' agreement. This Article will
accordingly address the conception of good faith as an interpretive
device, consistent with the idea that when courts interpret contracts
they should attempt to effectuate the intent of the parties, and with
Delaware's emphasis on maximum freedom of contract. Under this
reserved for their families.").
86. As Judge Easterbrook noted in that case, "[any attempt to add an
overlay of 'just cause'... to the exercise of contractual privileges would reduce
commercial certainty and breed costly litigation." Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at
1357. For a spirited critique of Kham & Nate's, see Dennis M. Patterson, A
Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 503 (1991). Michael Van Alstine argues that the good faith doctrine
reflects the idea that "some expectations may be so fundamental or obvious to
the parties that neither sees a necessity to raise them in negotiations ... nor
certainly to demand that they be reduced to writing." Van Alstine, supra note
79, at 1274. He suggests the good faith duty should therefore "direct attention
to the spirit of the parties' deal," and look to expectations that do not
necessarily find expression in the formal agreement. Id. But cf. Kham &
Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1357 ("Unless pacts are enforced according to their terms,
the institution of contract, with all the advantages private negotiation and
agreement brings, is jeopardized.").
87. Van Alstine has raised doubts about the Kham & Nate's analysis,
suggesting that its reasoning would result in a duty which "only rarely applies"
and "isof limited force when it does." See Van Alstine, supra note 79, at 1269.
Van Alstine's argument ultimately goes to the question of how much nontextual expectations should be incorporated into the interpretation of contracts.
See infra Part IV. For a defense of textualist contract analysis, see Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 568 n. 50 (2003) (proposing textualism for interpretation of
contract between commercial parties); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 826-27
(1992) (proposing default rules based on conventional understandings of
contractual language).
88. See Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1357 (addressing the applicability of
good faith doctrine "when the contract is silent").
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rubric, the justification for recognizing a good faith obligation is that
the agreement implicitly included the obligation, even if the parties
did not do so explicitly.
As will be developed below, the objective meaning of contractual
text is the most reliable evidence of the parties' intent where parties
have eliminated fiduciary duties. 9 If the text is clear, a discretiongranting contract term should be enforced to the letter. From this
perspective, a grant of discretion should be limited by good faith
considerations if the parties must have intended such a limitation.90
II.

DELAWARE'S PROVISIONS FOR ELIMINATING FIDUCIARY DUTIES

There are a number of ways in which parties place limits on
fiduciary duties. In several jurisdictions, courts have recognized the
validity of fiduciary opt outs that permit firm members to compete
with the firm, 9' allow parties to take business opportunities that
93
were available to the firm, 9 permit self-interested transactions, or
limit duties of disclosure. 94 Delaware's recent allowance for the
elimination of fiduciary duties should permit each of these results.
Before the recent statutory changes, Delaware statutes
provided a broad power to "restrict" fiduciary duties for limited
partnerships and LLCs. 95 Courts determined that contract terms
89. See infra notes 185-231 and accompanying text.
90. As Larry Ribstein has recently noted, good faith within partnerships
can be seen as either an interpretive rule or as a source of substantive terms.
The substantive understanding of good faith would involve "a distinct set of
nonfiduciary duties to protect others from harm that are sometimes applied to
people who may or not also be fiduciaries." Ribstein, The Structure of the
Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 24, at 17-18. For example, good faith may
include a duty to make disclosures of information in certain circumstances. Id.
at 18. To the extent contractual good faith entails mandatory substantive
duties, however, such a form of good faith duty would be in tension with the
freedom of contract endorsed by Delaware statute. An interpretive rule need
not raise these concerns.
91. See, e.g., Lynch Multimedia Corp. v. Carson Commc'ns, L.L.C., 102 F.
Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 (D. Kan. 2000); McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725
N.E.2d 1193, 1206 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
92. See, e.g., Kahn v. Icahn, No. CIV. A. 15916, 1998 WL 832629, at *4 (Del.
Ch. 1998).
93. See, e.g., Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 327 (Del. Ch. 1998).
94. See Ribstein, Unincorporated Firms, supra note 6, at 576-77 (citing

Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting explicit
authority supporting enforcement of waiver of disclosure duties).
95. The Delaware language originally stated that "the partner's duties and
liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provisions in a partnership
agreement." Larry E. Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the DelawareLimited
Partnershipand its Implicationsfor CorporateLaw, 16 J. CORP. L. 299, 300 n.2,

301-02 (1991) (describing limited partners' ability to expand or restrict duties
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could displace fiduciary duties, either through explicit terms or
through an agreement's structure.96 In the late 1990s, several
Delaware Chancery Court decisions in the limited partnership
context concluded that fiduciary duties were subject not only to
restriction, but to elimination.97
For example, in Sonet v. Timber Co.,98 the chancery court
addressed a claim by a holder of limited partner interests that a
general partner had engaged in a self-dealing transaction. 99 The
plaintiff claimed that the general partner unfairly received shares in
a real estate investment trust pursuant to a merger. 100 The court,
however, "decline[d] to rely unnecessarily on this Court's traditional
analyses involving fiduciary duties in the corporate context. " 1
Instead, the court looked to principles of contract interpretation to
resolve the case.

under Delaware law); cf Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 795
A.2d 160, 167-68 (Del. 2002).
96. See Sonet, 722 A.2d at 327 (holding that fiduciary duties were displaced
by the express terms of the agreement). The parties may also supplant
fiduciary duties by the structure of their agreement, which limits judicial
enforcement of fiduciary duties by adopting procedural remedies in their stead.
See, e.g., R.S.M., Inc. v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. Holdings, L.P., 790 A.2d 478,
498 (Del. Ch. 2001) (default fiduciary duties will be eschewed where contractual
mechanisms apply; in this case a ratification procedure); In re Cencom Cable
Income Partners, L.P. Litig., No. 14634, 1997 WL 666970, at *12 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(compliance with voting procedure sufficient to avoid liability); cf. Wilmington
Leasing, Inc. v. Parrish Leasing Co., Civ. A. No. 15202, 1996 WL 752364, at *14
(Del. Ch. 1996) ("Where, as here, a Partnership Agreement specifically
addresses the rights and duties of the partners, any fiduciary duty that might
be owed by the Limited Partners is satisfied by compliance with the applicable
provisions of the partnership agreement.").
97. See, e.g., Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., No.
CIV. A. 15754, 2000 WL 1476663, at *10 (Del Ch. Sept. 27, 2000), affd in part
rev'd in part, 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002); see also Sonet, 722 A.2d at 327. For an
in-depth discussion of limited partnership cases permitting restriction of
fiduciary duties, see Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited
PartnershipAgreements, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 927, 953-60 (2004). Expressions
of the freedom of contract principle were also made in the LLC context. See,
e.g., Walker v. Resource Dev. Co., 791 A.2d 799, 813 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating in
the LLC context, "[olnce members exercise their contractual freedom in their
limited liability company agreement, they can be virtually certain that the
agreement will be enforced in accordance with its terms") (quoting 2 R.F.
BALori & J.A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 20.4 (2000)); Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286,
291 (Del. 1999).
98. 722 A.2d 319.
99. Id. at 321.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 323.
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The limited partnership agreement in Sonet provided the
general partner with discretion "to manage virtually all of the
affairs of the [plartnership." 102 With respect to day-to-day affairs,
the general partner's discretion was subject to a requirement that
its "actions be fair and reasonable to the [partnership.' ' 3 But for
extraordinary acts, such as mergers, the general partner was given
"sole discretion"'0 4 checked by a requirement that a supermajority of
unitholders approve the transaction. 10 5 In light of this agreement
and the provision that the general partner had sole discretion over
the decision at issue, the court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss."6
In deciding the case, the Sonet court's analysis referred to the
Delaware statute's "apparently broad license to enhance, reform, or
even eliminate fiduciary duty protections."0 7 Subsequent Delaware
cases elaborated on the ability of limited partnership or LLC
agreements to replace fiduciary duties with contractual
alternatives. 8 These cases suggested fiduciary duties could not
only be restricted by an agreement, but eliminated altogether.' °9
In 2002, however, the Delaware Supreme Court weighed in on
the elimination of fiduciary duties for limited partnerships and
reached a different conclusion. In Gotham Partners v. Hallwood

102. Id. at 324.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 327.
107. See id. at 323 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005))

(emphasis added).
108. See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Real Estate Partners, No. Civ. A. 16788, 2001
WL 1045643 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2001); Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., No.
Civ. A. 18519, 792 A.2d 977 (Del. Ch. Aug. 23, 2001); R.S.M. Inc. v. Alliance
Capital Mgmt. Holdings L.P., 790 A.2d 478 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2001); Gotham
Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. (Gotham I), No. Civ. A. 15754,
2000 WL 1476663 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2000); see also In re Cencom Cable Income
Partners, No. Civ. A. 14634, 1996 WL 74726 at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 1996)
("[DRULPA] recognizes [that] partners may modify fiduciary duties through
contract. In other words, whether a general partner operates in good faith, with
due care or with requisite loyalty may be determined by the consistency to
which the general partner adheres to its contractual obligations. Put another
way, the limited partnership agreement may authorize actions creating a 'safe
harbor' for the general partner under circumstances that might otherwise be
questionable or impose a stricter standard of scrutiny than the norm.").
109. But cf. Ribstein, Limited PartnershipAgreements, supra note 6, at 960

("It is not clear whether the courts would have allowed replacement of the
fiduciary standard with a significantly weaker contractual standard had the
waiver been sufficiently clear.").
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1 the court addressed an appeal from a chancery
Realty Partners,"
court opinion that suggested fiduciary duties could be eliminated,
much as in Sonet."' The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed."
The Gotham Partnerscourt expressly cast doubt on dictum from
the chancery court opinion which had stated that Delaware law
permitted elimination of fiduciary duties."3 The Delaware Supreme
Court noted that there was nothing in the statute which mentioned
"that a limited partnership agreement may eliminate the fiduciary
duties or liabilities of a general partner."14
The Gotham Partnersdecision was short-lived."5 As of August,
2004, the Delaware legislature has opened up the possibility of
completely removing fiduciary duties. Under the new version of the
LLC statute:

To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager
or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a
limited liability company or to another member or manager or
to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a
limited liability company agreement, the member's or
manager's or other person's duties may be expanded or
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability
company agreement; provided that the... agreement may not
eliminate the6 implied contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."

With appropriate
the limited partnership statute says the
samefor
imied changes,
,.117
same for limited partnerships.
Accordingly, any limitations on the

110. 817 A.2d 160 (2002) (Gotham II).
111. See Gotham I, 2000 WL 1476663, at *10 ("But § 17-1101(d)(2) of
DRULPA expressly authorizes the elimination, modification, or enhancement of
these fiduciary duties in the written agreement governing the limited
partnership.").
112. Gotham H, 817 A.2d at 167-68.
113. Id. at 167 (noting that the issue was not before the court for review, but
that "this dictum should not be ignored because it could be misinterpreted in
future cases as a correct rule of law").
114. Id. at 168.
115. This does not mean that the amendments return matters to the status
quo before the Gotham H opinion. Recognition in chancery court opinions that
fiduciary duties might be eliminated is different from a statute which
guarantees that possibility. Cf Lemon, supra note 7, at 304 (suggesting
ambiguity on this question in cases prior to Gotham H). Parties may now be
certain that such duties are eliminated in particular cases by referencing the
statutory provision in their contracts.
116. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005) (emphasis added).
117. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005) (stating the same text in the
relevant part as the LLC statute).
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effect of fiduciary waivers. must be found in contract doctrine alone,
and not in fiduciary relations as such.
III. CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH DUTIES IN DELAWARE

The impact of these developments in fiduciary law depends
upon the applicability and content of contractual good faith duties.
Delaware's understanding of contractual good faith fills contractual
gaps based upon what the parties would have contracted for if they
had addressed the contingency at issue.11 Where the contract has
addressed the contingency, implied contractual good faith terms are
preempted by the agreement's text.
In Katz v. Oak Industries,"9 for example, Chancellor Allen
provided the following formulation of the court's analysis:
[Ius it clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the
parties who negotiated the express terms of the contract would
have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith-had they thought
to negotiate with respect to that matter. If the answer to this
question is yes, then, in my opinion, a court is justified in
concluding that such act
constitutes a breach of the implied
120
covenant of good faith.
The Katz formulation looks to the express contractual text when
considering whether a hypothetical bargain should be inferred.
Subsequent discussions of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by the Delaware Supreme Court confirm the narrow
coverage of the covenant in Delaware, including in the context of
limited partnerships. 2 '
Arguably, the Delaware courts have
restricted the coverage of good faith duties since Katz was decided.
In Cincinnati SMSA Limited Partnership v. Cincinnati Bell
CellularSystems Co.,' 22 the Delaware Supreme Court explained that
"[in cases where obligations can be understood from the text of a
written agreement but have nevertheless been omitted in a literal
sense, a court's inquiry should focus on 'what the parties likely
118. See, e.g., DuPont v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443 (Del. 1996); PAMILEMB I Inc. v. EMB-NHC, L.L.C., 857 A.2d 998, 1016 (Del. Ch.2004).
119. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986). Note that the Katz formulation addresses
the content of good faith duties in terms of the parties' hypothetical bargain, but
also makes reference to the express terms of the contract for guidance.
120. Id. at 880.
121. See, e.g., Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys.
Co. 708 A.2d 989, 990 (Del. 1998) (discussing a limited partnership); Cont'l Ins.
Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Del. Ch. 2000) (discussing a limited
partnership).
122. 708 A.2d 989 (Del. 1998).
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would have done if they had considered the issues involved.' 123 The
court emphasized, however, that such implied terms "should be rare
and fact-intensive, turning on issues of compelling fairness." 24
Under this approach, implying obligations based on good faith "is a
cautious enterprise."'25 As the court explained, in order to properly
plead a claim of breach of the implied covenant, a plaintiff
must
126
misrepresentation."
or
deceit,
fraud,
of
aspect
"an
allege
The Cincinnati Bell court also concluded that courts "should be
no less cautious or exacting when asked to imply contractual
obligations from the written text of a limited partnership
agreement." 1 7 This last conclusion suggests that the contractual
duty of good faith is not qualitatively different depending on
whether the context is a limited partnership or LLC, as opposed to a
run of the mill contract. Contractual duties of good faith involve the
same doctrine in both cases.
As the Delaware Chancery Court explained in the same case,
"[erms are to be implied in a contract not because they are
reasonable but because they are necessarily involved in the
contractual relationship so that the parties must have intended them
and have only failed to express them because they are too obvious to
need expression."2
The obligation thus applies when the parties
could not have contemplated the exercise of discretion which is the
subject of dispute.129
123. Id. at 992 (citing DuPont, 679 A.2d at 443; Schwartzberg v. CRITEF
Assocs., 685 A.2d 365, 376 (Del Ch. 1996)). The court also observed that "it is
not the proper role of a court to rewrite or supply omitted provisions to a
written agreement." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 992-93 (citing Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96,
101-02 (Del. 1992)); see also Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219,
1234 (Del. Ch. 2000) (citing Merrill, 606 A.2d at 101) (noting that in a limited
partnership case "[tihe Delaware Supreme Court has explicitly held that a
claimant must demonstrate that the conduct at issue involved fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in order to prove a breach of the implied covenant").
127. See Cincinnati Bell, 708 A.2d at 993. Deborah A. DeMott has
contended that, rather than the standard described in Katz, Delaware LLCs
should fall under a robust "best efforts" type standard. See DeMott, Fiduciary
Preludes, supra note 6, at 1058-62. Her argument relies on drawing a
distinction between different contexts for good faith, depending upon how
contingent the contract is. This is a distinction which Delaware courts do not
appear to have adopted.
128. Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., No.
C.A. 15388, 1997 WL 525873, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1997) (emphasis added)
(quoting Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n of Delaware, 101 A.2d 308, 313-14
(Del. Ch. 1953)), affd, 708 A.2d 989 (Del. 1998).
129. But cf. Schwartzberg v. CRITEF Assocs., 685 A.2d 365, 376 (Del. Ch.
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Express terms that affirmatively address the parties'
obligations are decisive when construing the content of good faith. A
good faith term may supplement a contract where the text does not
explicitly address an issue, but implied terms are rejected when they
conflict with the express contract. 130 Accordingly, in looking to the
parties' apparent or presumed intent, the contractual duty of good
faith is a method of enforcing the actual agreement.'
Rather than
a means to enforce a mandatory norm of business conduct, the good
faith duty is a means by which courts interpret contracts that are
silent as to specific contingencies. 3 2
A discretion-granting provision may be silent as to the standard
that governs that discretion. 133 However, an agreement may also
address the precise conduct at issue: thus, it is not a breach of good
faith to compete with an LLC if the LLC agreement contains a
clause that expressly permits such competition. Similarly, a term
granting "sole" or "absolute" discretion, while eliminating fiduciary
duties, leaves little room for implied terms respecting that

1996) (suggesting that the Katz requirement that it be "clear" that the parties
would have proscribed the conduct at issue is "probably too high"). The
Schwartzberg court instead suggested that a claim should succeed when "it is
more likely than not" that if the parties had thought to address the subject,
they would have agreed to create the obligation at issue. Id. Schwartzberg's
formulation is difficult to square with the strict standard set forth in
subsequent Delaware Supreme Court opinions, discussed supra.
130. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1143 (Del. 1990) (noting that
implied good faith standards cannot override literal terms of an agreement); see
also Cont'l Ins. Co., 750 A.2d at 1234 (rejecting a bad faith claim based on the
limited partnership provisions agreed to).
131. See, e.g., Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 70, at 371 ("The good
faith performance doctrine establishes a standard for contract interpretation
and a covenant that is implied in every contract ....

[Tihe courts employ the

good faith performance doctrine to effectuate the intentions of parties, or to
protect their reasonable expectations."); Ribstein, The Structure of the Fiduciary
Relationship,supra note 24, at 20 ("[Glood faith is an interpretation rule... its
application in a particular case ultimately depends on the terms of the parties'
contract."); Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 513 ("Good faith is merely a way of
interpreting whether the parties adhered to the duties imposed upon them by
the corporate charter or by contractual agreement.").
132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Arvida/JMB Partners v. Vanderbilt Income and Growth
Assocs., No. CIV. A. 15238-NC, 1997 WL 294440, at *5 (Del. Ch. 1997) (rejecting
review of absolute discretion for abuse, but noting that "a discretionary right
must nonetheless be exercised in good faith."); see also Van Alstine, supra note
79, at 1287 ("The parties may well have agreed that the discretionary power
was to be absolute and unrestricted; indeed, in some circumstances it may be in
the best interest of both parties to do so. To say that this follows from the mere
fact of discretion, however, is to begin the analysis with its own conclusion.").
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discretion.
Sandra Miller has recently argued-in a pre-amendment
article-that Delaware recognizes a mandatory minimum of
acceptable conduct for LLCs under the doctrine of good faith. 35 In
contrast with the default good faith obligations described above,
Miller proposes a contractual standard of good faith that would
create a "mandatory core of acceptable business conduct." 136 From

this perspective, equitable concepts of fairness would be a part of the
interpretation of LLC and limited partnership agreements.'37
As a potential source for these duties, Miller looks to the
38
chancery court decision in Solar Cells, Inc. v. True North Partners.
The Solar Cells case involved an attempt to merge an LLC, First
Solar, into a subsidiary of the defendant, True North, in a manner
that diluted the holdings (and harmed the interests) of minority
managers of the LLC.19

However, although the issue of good faith

duties arose in the Solar Cells decision, it was not a contractual good
faith case. The Solar Cells court implicitly found that the LLC

134. See, e.g., Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 325 (Del. Ch. 1998) (finding
that in light of terms of agreement that permitted the general partner to act
according to its own discretion, "there is no requirement that the General
Partner consider the interests of the limited partners in resolution of a conflict
of interest").
Even nontextualist theories have recognized that explicit
language may suffice to remove discretionary acts from good faith challenges.
Cf. Van Alstine, supra note 79, at 1301 (calling for sufficient notice to the other
party, but concluding that "[a] negotiated deal between sophisticated parties
may require little (or no) affirmative actions from the party seeking discretion,
beyond the appropriately explicit agreement on her unrestricted discretion").
135. See Miller, supra note 2, at 1643-45; see also DeMott, Fiduciary
Preludes, supra note 6, at 1057-62 (describing contractual good faith as a limit
on conduct within the LLC). As Miller notes, the Delaware limited partnership
and LLC statutes are virtually identical in this context, such that precedents
for the one are relevant to the other. Miller, supra note 2, at 1636. Accordingly,
this Article will cite cases involving either entity for purposes of the analysis
below.
136. Miller, supranote 2, at 1646, 1653.
137. See id. at 1654 ("Regardless of how courts articulate their judicial tests,
reverence for the written contract must be tempered with the recognition that
judicial review is a good and essential thing, as is a mandatory core of
acceptable manager and/or member conduct."). It is not at all clear how this
conception can be squared with the Delaware requirement that courts give
maximum effect to the principle of contractual freedom.
138. No. Civ. A. 19477, 2002 WL 749163 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002); see Miller,
supra note 2, at 1644-45 (citing Solar Cells under section of article on
contractually-based good faith standards, but noting that "[tihe court did not
distinguish between good faith as an express contractual standard and good
faith in a fiduciary sense").
139. Solar Cells, 2002 WL 749163, at *2.
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agreement had not waived all fiduciary duties, 4" and expressly
noted that the majority managers' actions were unacceptable
because they "do not appear to be those of fiduciaries acting in good
faith."'
Thus, the outcome in Solar Cells should not predict outcomes in
purely contractual, nonfiduciary cases.'42 As noted above, the good
faith duties of fiduciaries are not the same as the contractual good
Where a contract has eliminated
faith duties of nonfiduciaries.'
fiduciary duties, implied contractual good faith duties are
potentially narrower in scope than the fiduciary duties they
replace.144 Because of these differences, contractual good faith
140. Id. at *4 ("Even if waiver of liability for engaging in conflicting interest
transactions is contracted for, that does not mean that there is a waiver of all
fiduciary duties to Solar Cells.").
141. See id. It should be noted that another LLC case of this type also
involved fiduciary good faith duties. See VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995,
2000 WL 1277372, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000) (describing failure to discharge
duty of loyalty in good faith).
142. In some nonfiduciary contexts, Delaware courts have been notably
unsympathetic to claims of investor interests harmed by a merger. See, e.g.,
Benchmark Capital Partners IV v. Vague, No. Civ. A. 19719, 2002 WL 1732423
at *16 (Del Ch. July 15, 2002) (rejecting injunctive relief for preferred
stockholders that sought to block merger); cf Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d
1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993) (rejecting creation of "special, judicially-created rules"
to protect minority stockholders of closely held corporations). It also bears
mention that the entire fairness standard is not a source of mandatory
standards in this context. Entire fairness review is a creature of corporate
fiduciary law. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
Should the parties choose to eliminate fiduciary duties, then entire fairness
could cease to be the applicable standard. See, e.g., Gelfman v. Weeden
Investors, L.P., 859 A.2d 89, 121 (Del. Ch. 2004); In re Cencom Cable Partners,
L.P., No. 14634, 1997 WL 666970, *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1997). But see Miller,
supra note 2, at 1641-43 (proposing entire fairness review as source of
mandatory standards of business conduct); cf. Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a
Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations,77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099,
1142-44 (1999) (discussing entire fairness test in context of squeeze outs).
143. See Burton, Breach of Contract,supra note 64, at 372, n.17 ("Good faith
performance also should not be equated with 'good faith'.., as a fiduciary duty,
because the doctrine obviously could not mean that every contract requires
'something stricter than the morals of the marketplace.'"). The distinction was
also recently noted by Chancellor Chandler in the Disney litigation. See In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at *35
n.449 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005). The conclusion that cases like Solar Cells are not
on point flows from more than just the distinction between good faith and
fiduciary relations, however. It is also because the provision eliminating
fiduciary status is a term which indicates the parties' contractual intent.
144. Most notably, contractual good faith duties do not preclude selfish
behavior. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 1658 (describing substantive differences
between implied contractual good faith duties and fiduciary duties); DeMott,
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should not be conflated with good faith in the fiduciary context." 5
In addition, contractual good faith duties implied under a
limited partnership or LLC agreement are not mandatory, even in
cases that implicate concerns similar to those in Solar Cells. For
example, consider the recent analysis of46contractual good faith
duties in Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P.1

In Gelfman, the Delaware Chancery Court addressed a limited
partnership agreement which had been amended such that outside
investors were squeezed out for less than the market value of their
units.
Insiders, on the other hand, were able to receive a much
better value for their units. 148 The partnership agreement required

the general partner to act on behalf of the partnership. 49 However,
the agreement also included a provision that granted the general
partner broad discretion to resolve conflicts of interest and insulated
the general partner150 from liability for such acts if taken in the
absence of bad faith.

The court determined that the insiders had consciously chosen
to deprive the outsiders of their units for less than fair market
value, and that there was no rational justification for their actions."'
The conduct in Gelfman clearly conflicted with fiduciary duties.
However, the court's opinion was also premised on a failure to meet
contractual good faith duties."2
Beyond Metaphor,supra note 5, at 892-901 (same).
145. This is the case regardless of whether fiduciary good faith is viewed as
a freestanding duty, a subsidiary subpart of loyalty, or as an interpretive
measure. A partnership agreement that eliminates fiduciary duties eliminates
the fiduciary duty of good faith. It also alters the impact of how one interprets
the discretion contractually granted. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 512:
Fiduciary duties are substantive obligations which must be honored in
good faith in the same way that contractual obligations must be
honored in good faith. If the intensity of that obligation is stronger in
a corporate relationship, it is not because the notion of good faith is
different, it is because the loyalty demanded from a fiduciary is
different from the loyalty demanded of a "garden-variety" contractual
agreement.
Id. If the duty of loyalty is restricted, then what it means to honor the
remaining contractual obligations in good faith changes.
146. 859 A.2d 89 (Del. Ch. 2004).
147. Id. at 93-94.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 110-11.
150. Id. at 110-12.
151. Id. at 122.
152. Id. at 124. Other types of harm to minority interests also trigger
contractual good faith concerns, if sufficiently egregious. Misappropriation of
assets, for example, is hard to square with contractual good faith. Cf. Walker v.
Resource Dev. Co., 791 A.2d 799, 817 (Del. Ch. 2000) (rejecting the application

150
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In Gelfman, contractual good faith duties do not reflect
mandatory standards of business conduct, and the chancery court
made this point clearly:
[Ihf the future of the firm as a profit-generating entity requires
the departure of some owners, the minimally acceptable
standard of good faith action would seem to require, in the
absence of a contractual right to force out certain owners at a
different price, that the firm pay any equity owner being forced
out fair market value for their equity share. 53
The Gelfman opinion, forceful as it was in condemning the actions of
the partnership insiders, indicates that contractual good faith
requirements did not inherently mandate conduct.
As the above cases demonstrate, Delaware's LLC and limited
partnership law emphasizes contractual freedom. Where LLC or
limited partnership agreements are clear, they are able to eliminate
fiduciary duties. Contractual good faith duties may fill a gap in an
agreement, if there is one, but contract law does not mandate that
these implied duties be included in an agreement. Instead, the role
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is consistently
circumscribed by contractual text.
IV. GOOD FAITH DUTIES AND CONTRACTUAL SILENCE:
THE PROBLEM OF CONTRACTUAL GAP-FILLING AND
THE PARTIES' REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

A requirement that specific good faith duties must give way to
the parties' express agreement is largely accepted."
Parties are
generally capable of deciding how to govern their relationship if55
their contract is not unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable.
of a provision limiting liability for members of LLC that relied in good faith on
the terms of the operating agreement and finding "no doubt that the legislature
never intended this provision to allow the members of an LLC to
misappropriate property from another member and avoid returning that
property or otherwise compensating the wronged member").
153. Gelfman, 859 A.2d at 124 (emphasis added).
154. For example, Van Alstine notes that "[tihere is persuasive force in the
argument that informed parties should be able to agree at the formation stage
on a contractual power whose exercise is not subject to subsequent review
under external standards of 'fair' and 'reasonable' conduct." Van Alstine, supra
note 79, at 1292. The debate over what it takes to reach an enforceable
limitation of implied terms on this basis is a separate question. Compare Van
Alstine, supra note 79, at 1292, and Patterson, supra note 86 at 524, with
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2., Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
155. See Burton, A Reply, supra note 68, at 499-500 (arguing that absent
unconscionability, estoppel, or impossibility/impracticability, "it is hard to see
what justifies a court in disregarding the agreement of the parties on grounds of
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Disagreement focuses on the question
of when express terms are
1 56
gaps.
contractual
close
to
sufficient
Contractual incompleteness is at the heart of good faith duties;
courts repeatedly note that the good faith duty does not permit
courts to imply terms that conflict with contractual text. 157 As Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner explain, however, the "question of when a
contract is incomplete is identical to the question of what is
sufficient to contract around a default."'58
In other words,
background principles of interpretation are crucial in 1determining
59
whether there is a gap to be filled by substantive terms.
It is certainly true that long-term relational contracts cannot
explicitly address every future contingency. 6 ° All such contracts are
open to the interpretation that they are incomplete with respect to
future events. But one need not define contractual incompleteness
based on whether the parties have explicitly addressed each
conceivable circumstance affecting their relation.
Parties can
contractually pre-commit themselves to an outcome even where they
have difficulty predicting future disputes. Since humans are not
able to predict the future, there is a limitless potential for locating
contractual gaps, but incompleteness (like ambiguity) remains

'contractual morality' when the intentions of the parties or their reasonable
expectations can be ascertained."); see also Patterson, supra note 86, at 522
(disagreeing with the textualism in Kham & Nate's, yet noting that "it is
important to recall that one acts in good faith relative to the agreement of the
parties").

156. Cf. Van Alstine, supra note 79, at 1292-93 (proposing a substantial
burden in terms of clarity and notice for parties that seek to provide for
discretion that would close off good faith duties).
157. See, e.g., Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys.,
708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998) ("Delaware observes the well-established
principle that (absent grounds for reformation which are not present here) it is
not the proper role of a court to rewrite or supply omitted provisions to a
written agreement."); see also L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402,
404 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that good faith cannot interfere with "explicit
provisions of contracts."). For a list of cases along these lines, see Van Alstine,
supra note 79, at 1261-62, n.154.
158. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 120 (1989).

159. It is arguable that background rules sometimes make it too difficult for
certain investors to protect their interests. See D. Gordon Smith, Independent
Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture Capital
Contracts, 40 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 825 (2004).
160. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (2003) ("There are infinite states of the world

and the capacities of contracting parties to condition their future performance
on each possible state are finite.").

152
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61
dependent upon one's interpretive approach.
A contractual governance mechanism for resolving business
decisions can be read to address any contingency within the scope of
that governance. As John Coffee, Jr. has noted in a similar context:

[I]t is something of a misnomer to speak of terms that are
"missing" or "omitted" from the corporate contract. Although
omissions can sometimes occur, the corporate charter has its
own default rule: Except as specified to the contrary,
everything is to be decided by the 1board
(subject possibly to the
62
check of shareholder ratification).
By extension, the gap-filling dilemma can be fully addressed by the
163
discretion granted under a limited partnership or LLC agreement.
Arguably, no terms are missing from an agreement when each
potential contingency is delegated for a subsequent determination
by the firm's management. When this is so is the interpretive issue.
Whatever one's perspective on the content of good faith duties,
certain categories of conduct are clear examples of bad faith
conduct."M
It does not take any stretch of the imagination to
conclude that these instances conflict with the parties' implicit
agreement, even where the agreement is otherwise complete. A
party that intentionally hinders the performance of other parties to
a contract violates his duty of good faith. 165 A party that engages in
161. Cf. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 158, at 119 ("The litigants in many
cases will argue not only about how the gap should be filled but also about
whether there is a gap at all.").
162. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 1682. Coffee notes that the "gap" respecting
how board power is used has been filled by fiduciary duty, "unless the parties
can and do opt out from it." Id.
163. Arguably, this is really a problem of ambiguity rather than gap-filling,
to the extent that the discretion-granting provision is seen as addressing the
relevant conduct. The ambiguity is then what the meaning of "discretion" is.
On the other hand, the absence of a discretion-governing term can also be
described as a gap. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract
Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1586 (2005) (describing the distinction
between a gap and an ambiguity). The distinction can have interpretive
relevance. As Judge Posner has noted, gap-filling cases call for a different
analysis from ambiguity cases: "In the case of ambiguity the court cannot just
lift a ready-made clause off the shelf and plug it into the case to decide the
interpretive question, reasonably confident that if the rule didn't fit the parties
would have excluded it from their contract." Id. at 1589.
164. Cf. Summers, supra note 62, at 232-43 (listing categories of bad faith
recognized by courts). Among the examples of bad faith conduct described by
Summers, certain instances would be hard to contract around. For example, it
is difficult to conceive of the contract which creates a reasonable expectation of
fraud in performance.
165. Cf. Van Alstine, supra note 79, at 1309 (noting that the good faith duty
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166
fraud in connection with the exercise of discretion does so as well.
Regardless of one's theory of good faith, the result should be the
same in these instances.
Beyond these more obvious examples, the nature of good faith is
fact intensive, varying from case to case.'67 Commentators have had
difficulty defining the precise contours of good or bad faith conduct
outside the parameters of specific contexts. 168 Consequently, there is
uncertainty as to precisely when an implied good faith term will
preclude conduct otherwise covered by fiduciary duties.' 69
Uncertainty over the content of implied good faith terms is mirrored
by uncertainty over when implied terms are contractually
superseded by a fiduciary waiver.
A provision clear enough to supplant fiduciary duties may
supplant terms otherwise implied under the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.7
The more tailored the fiduciary opt-out, the
easier it is to determine whether it covers the conduct at issue.' 7' In
some cases, parties may prefer a vague standard to govern their
conduct, yet still choose to remove fiduciary duties.'7 2 In other cases,

would exist even in cases of unrestricted discretionary power). Van Alstine
proposes as examples "any affirmative actions by a party to prevent or interfere
with performance by the other," and also acts of deception that occur prior to, or
in connection with, an exercise of discretion. Id.
166. Cf. id. at 1309 nn. 350-51 (listing cases in which deception resulted in a
determination of bad faith in connection with grant of discretion).
167. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 62, at 201; see also DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor, supra note 5, at 892 (suggesting that both fiduciary duties and good
faith resist "attempts to capture their meanings in general definitions").
169. Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation Under Intellectual Siege:
Contemporary Challenges to the Duty to be Loyal, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 471,
490 (1992) (discussing unanswered questions when applying good faith
standards to corporate actors).
170. Cf R.S.M. v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. Holdings, 790 A.2d 472, 498 (Del.
Ch. 2001) (explaining that irreconcilability of contract terms "can itself be
evidence of the clear intention of the parties to preempt fiduciary principles");
Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 326 (Del. Ch. 1998).
171. This is significant given the courts' reluctance to find a waiver of
fiduciary duty unless it is clear, and the fact that even a clear waiver may only
be found to apply to a narrow context. Taking this concept further, John Coffee
has supported a transaction specificity requirement to guarantee that parties
can price the risks of their agreement. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 1667-71.
Coffee's proposal, however, is not grounded in good faith doctrine, and in any
event is inconsistent with the maximum freedom of contract. See generally
infra Part VII.
172. See, e.g., Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 795 A.2d 160,
163-64 (Del. 2002) (replacing fiduciary standard with entire fairness); Gelfman
v. Weeden Investors, 792 A.2d 977, 985 (Del. Ch. 2001) (replacing fiduciary duty
with duty of good faith). On the efficiency benefits of contractual vagueness, see
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they may desire a gapless contract, and choose to get rid of fiduciary
duties and grant absolute discretion to a manager. Intermediate
options also exist, as firms often remove fiduciary duties for a
specific type of transaction, while leaving them intact elsewhere.
Unsurprisingly, the fiduciary
opt-out language affects the
173
contractual interpretation.
The meaning of these provisions is ultimately dependent on a
court's interpretive predilections. Courts may read a discretiongranting provision as textually closing off implied limitations on
that discretion, as occurs in good faith cases like Kham & Nate's.
Under this rubric, good faith duties are only necessary when an
exercise of discretion is an unreasonable interpretation of the
contractual text.
However, as Michael Van Alstine explains, it is also possible to
view broad grants of contractual discretion as incomplete:
The observation that one of the parties has "reserved a
privilege" to take a certain action merely begs the question of
what standards (if any) should govern the exercise of such
discretion.
The parties may well have agreed that the
discretionary power was to be absolute and unrestricted;
indeed, in some circumstances this may be in the best interest
of both parties to do so. To say that this follows from the mere
fact of discretion,
however, is to begin the analysis with its
74
own conclusion.
Any discretion-granting provisions could leave open the possibility
of a gap. The interesting question is what it should take for parties
to avoid this result.
A.

The Absolute Discretion Term

Just as good faith duties are protean, so too are the potential
contract terms that delimit fiduciary and good faith duties. The
parties to LLC and limited partnership agreements often draft
75
reticulated, intricate terms to describe their respective duties.
generally George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A
Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065
(2002).
173. See Ribstein, Unincorporated Firms, supra note 6, at 584 ("[Tlhe
fiduciary duty waiver would be one of the partnership terms to which courts
must give independent effect in interpreting the partnership agreement under a
'good faith' analysis.").
174. Van Alstine, supra note 79, at 1287.
175. See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 381 ("The agreements can be terribly
complex, often extending for hundreds of pages."). The complexity of these
terms may also be relevant to interpretation, as they may suggest that the
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They also draft novel formulations of contractual obligations. In the
Gelfman case, the chancery court noted with evident frustration
that the terms it interpreted were "seemingly prepared by a member
of a cold-blooded species rather than a breathing, feeling member of
our species
trying to capture in words an actual human state of
176
mind."

In light of the potential variations, one reasonably established
term bears emphasis: the contractual grant of "sole" or "absolute"
discretion. 177 This provision is of particular interest because it
provides, in general terms, for the greatest scope of managerial
discretion. 7 8 A number of contracts replace fiduciary duties with
standards of behavior, such as good faith or entire fairness; these
agreements, even read narrowly, call for judicially implied terms.
An absolute discretion term is different, and implicates the full
extent to which contract doctrine differs from fiduciary doctrine.
The mere declaration of absolute discretion in a limited
partnership or LLC agreement could plausibly mean absolute
discretion, subject to fiduciary constraints. 7 9 However, in many
cases, parties to a limited partnership or LLC will choose to waive
all default duties. 8 ° When coupled with a contractual clause or

contractual language chosen reflected careful consideration. See generally
Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, & Richard Zeckhauzer, The Design and
Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91

(2000).
176. Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., 859 A.2d 89, 112 (Del. Ch. 2004).
177. The words "sole" and "absolute" will be used interchangeably for
purposes of this Article. Both terms are applied to similar effect by contracting
parties. For examples of cases interpreting these types of terms, see, e.g.,
Miller v. American Real Estate Partners, L.P., No. Civ. A. 16788, 2001 WL
1045643 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2001); Gelfman, 792 A.2d 977; Gotham Partners, L.P.
v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., No. Civ. A. 15754, 2000 WL 1476663 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 27, 2000); Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998).
178. By way of comparison, prior approaches to these issues have required
greater specificity in a fiduciary opt-out. Cf. Unif. P'ship Act § 103, 6 U.L.A. 73
(1997) (stating that the duty of loyalty may not be eliminated, but parties may
"identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of
loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable"); see also Coffee, supra note 5, at 166771.
179. Cf. Miller, 2001 WL 1045643, at *9 (holding that a grant of sole and
complete discretion did not preclude fiduciary duties); see also Labovitz v.

Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that a grant of sole
discretion did not waive fiduciary duties). Labovitz has proven controversial for
its suggestion that the parties could not have removed the fiduciary character of
the limited partnership. That concern is no longer an issue for purposes of
Delaware law.
180. See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 382 ("In addition to the covenants that
limit the scope of behavior available to the general partners, the limited

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

structure that precludes fiduciary duties, absolute discretion on its
face provides unfettered discretion over the subject matter it
181
covers.
As a result of this broad scope, the absolute discretion term is
ideal for purposes of analyzing contractual good faith duties. If
courts enforce absolute discretion terms to the letter, there is little
room for judicially implied standards of acceptable business conduct.
If, on the other hand, there are substantial limits on discretion even
in this context, then those limits will often be impractical to contract
around.
Interpretation of the absolute discretion term is therefore a
proxy for determining how much contractual freedom is available for
limited partnerships and LLCs. 18 2 Strictly interpreted, an absolute
discretion term only permits judicial oversight in egregious cases.
B. InterpretingAgreements that Restrict JudicialEnforcement:
The Rationalefor a Textualist Approach
As will be developed, textualism is the appropriate interpretive
method for contract terms that replace fiduciary duties.
For
statutes, this means that the objective meaning of a statutory text,
as understood by a reasonable, competent user of the language, is
the correct interpretation. 83 Recent scholarship has promoted a
partnership agreement usually includes a waiver of all default duties under the
applicable law of limited partnerships (usually Delaware).").
181. This presumes that the absolute discretion term is understood to cover
the subject matter at issue. Ambiguity as to that question could limit the
applicability of the discretion, however absolute it may be. See Ribstein,
Limited PartnershipAgreements, supra note 6, at 948 ("Even clear fiduciary

duty waivers do not necessarily cover all potential fiduciary breaches. Courts
understandably hold that conduct outside the waiver is covered by default
fiduciary duties.").
182. And, given that this term is already in use and occupies one end of the
discretionary spectrum, it shows promise for the development of standardized
meanings. Other terms are also significant, such as a term which replaces
fiduciary duties with good faith. I will not here pursue what it might mean to
perform under a good faith clause in good faith. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 16,
at 510 n.83 ("The author will resist the temptation to speculate on the
obligation to carry out the [fiduciary] duty of good faith in good faith."). For
alternate terms, the interaction of the structure and context of the agreement
might require a different understanding of contractual completeness. DeMott
has noted the interpretive confusion which new formulations may cause.
DeMott, supra note 169, at 491,92.
183. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALLA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1997) ("We look for a sort of 'objectified' intent-the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris."); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original
Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 59, 61 (1988)
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similar approach in contract interpretation.
Under a textualist approach, contracts should be interpreted
according to the objective meaning of express contractual language,
based on the reasonable understanding of a competent reader.'8 5
Courts should assume that the contract is written in "majority talk"
rather than private meanings shared by the parties. 18 6 The parol
evidence rule should be followed, unless the contract is ambiguous,'
and ex post fairness concerns should not trump binding contract
language.'88

(explaining that courts should look to "the ring the words [of a statute] would
have had to a skilled user of words at the time, thinking about the same
problem."). Helpful analyses of textualist thought are set forth in William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2456-67 (2003);
Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347 (2005); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983) (setting forth a

textualist theory of interpretation).
184.

See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of

Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 749, 769-70 (2000) (suggesting the
benefits of formalism as a way to avoid opportunistic suit and arguing that
formalism makes sense if one assumes judicial incompetence); Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 87, at 568-69 (proposing textualism for the interpretation of
contracts between sophisticated parties that do not create externalities); Robert
E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847

(2000) (proposing formalism in contract law based on the reliability of
interpretation and promotion of standardized terms).
But cf. Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World:
What to Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 323 (2004) (taking issue with formalism
as a response to the concerns these authors raise).
185. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87, at 569 ("We will argue here

that the majoritarian default is Willistonian: Typical firms prefer courts to
make interpretations on a narrow evidentiary base whose most significant
component is the written contract."). See generally id. at 570-94 for a detailed
analysis supporting this conclusion.
186. See id. at 570, 585-86 (explaining why a plain-meaning, "majority talk"
interpretation of a contract would reduce strategic behavior).
187. Cf. Scott, supra note 184, at 866 ("A rigorous application of the
common-law plain meaning and parol evidence rules would preserve the value
of predictable interpretation and encourage parties to take precautions in
selecting terms with well-defined meanings."); see also Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 87, at 591-92.
188. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87 at 597 (explaining on efficiency
grounds why fairness-based defaults would not work). The authors suggest
that "[p1arties have the incentive (and often the ability) to contract out of even
fair defaults that do not maximize surplus." Id. As Schwartz and Scott note,
"firms want the state to enforce the contracts that they write, not the contracts
that a decisionmaker with a concern for fairness would prefer them to have
written." Id. at 618; cf. Ribstein, UnincorporatedFirms, supra note 6, at 560
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Courts that decline to find implied terms unless the text
requires them also apply a form of textualism. 8 9 Rejection of
implied terms in this fashion means that the terms governing the
parties' relationship are solely those terms that the parties chose to
put into writing. Good faith still plays a role in such cases; express
contractual terms are sometimes premised on an implied standard
of conduct. 19° The contractual textualist, however, is reluctant to
find such occasions unless the contractual language itself calls for
this result.
This last sense of textualism (respecting implied terms) will be
the primary focus of the discussion that follows. This Article does
not take the position that judicial nonintervention is desired by the
members of all, or even most, firms that waive fiduciary duties.
Rather, it makes the more modest claim that when an LLC or
limited partnership agreement replaces fiduciary duties, courts
should take the contractual language at face value.
As a
consequence, absolute discretion terms should generally be
interpreted as gap-free.
Some commentators have questioned the rationality of a
decision to eliminate fiduciary duties unless there is a robust form of
good faith duty. 9'
In addition, parties do not readily enter92
them entirely at the mercy of others.1
place
which
agreements
("Commentators also have suggested that mandatory fiduciary duty rules force
managers to engage in behavior that is appropriate because it is ethical, instills
trust in beneficiaries, or complies with generally accepted business norms. But
it is not clear what the 'right' behavior is. Commentators' own conclusions are
wholly subjective.'); J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties,
and Partnerships:The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 439, 464 (1997) ("[Who decides what is the 'collective good'? What
fairness is achieved by imposing this external and vague standard upon two
parties to a private fiduciary relationship who are bargaining for their own
interests and have no interest in or even understanding of the collective good?").
189. See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note 79, at 1224 (describing "the rise of a
new textualist approach to the contractual duty of good faith.").
190. This analysis arguably goes beyond gap-filling. It is beyond the scope of
this article to assess whether such cases raise the issue of "gaps" or of
ambiguities. In either event, textualists read contractual language in context,
and this includes room for implicit meanings of the text.
191. See DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes, supra note 6, at 1061 ("[An LLC or
limited partnership agreement that completely abjured fiduciary obligation
would, in the absence of a robust implied obligation of good faith, resemble a
gift of members' property to those in control of the enterprise who would be free
to use the entity's property as they saw fit... [Ilt strains credulity excessively to
characterize membership in an LLC or a limited partnership, once formed, as
indicative of intention to execute a gift transaction.").
192. See Van Alstine, supra note 79, at 1295 (explaining that an expectation
of reasonableness when exercising a discretionary power "is a refined reflection
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Given the degree of control that fiduciary-type relationships provide
over critical resources, it is necessary to explain why people would
enter into a limited partnership or LLC without contract doctrines
that at least resemble fiduciary obligation. There are several
reasons.
Fiduciary duties carry a variety of costs that counterbalance
their benefits. 9 3 For example, an overbroad enforcement of the duty
of care negatively affects a fiduciary's willingness to take risks.9
Doctrines like the business judgment rule protect against these
concerns in many cases.'9 5 When the business judgment rule
applies, courts presume that managers are acting in good faith, with
due care, and in the best interests of the firm. 96 But the business
judgment rule will not always address investors' concerns
satisfactorily, especially to the 1extent
that it permits judicial second97
guessing of business decisions.

of the traditional maxim that the law should not assume that one party has put
itself at the mercy of another."); see also Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118
N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.) (concluding that the law should not "suppose
that one party was to be placed at the mercy of the other").
193. See Hynes, supra note 6, at 44 ("[A] lack of foreseeability is what drives
partners to draft provisions qualifying or eliminating fiduciary duties.
Foreseeability in this context relates not to opportunistic behavior but rather to
what courts may do in interpreting and applying mandatory fiduciary duties.").
194. See Ribstein, UnincorporatedFirms, supra note 6, at 549 ("[A] duty of

care may force the fiduciary to refrain from conduct that may be construed to
have been unduly risky if, ex post, the conduct is unprofitable. This is
particularly a problem in firms that have passive, limited liability investors
whose investment in the firm is part of a diversified portfolio.").
195. Cf. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[B]ecause potential
profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of
shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate
decisions."); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as

Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 110-17 (2004) (describing the business
judgment rule as partially justified by encouraging risk taking). It should be
noted that the business judgment rule has been adopted for Delaware limited
partnerships. See In re Boston Celtics Ltd. P'ship S'holders Litig., No. C.A.
16511 1999 WL 641902, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 1999) (recognizing the businessjudgment-rule protections for actions of general partners).
196.

See, e.g., Boston Celtics, 1999 WL 641902, at *4 ("[Tlhe business

judgment rule generally protects the actions of general partners, affording them
a presumption that they acted on an informed basis and in the honest belief
that they acted in the best interest of the partnership and the limited
partners.").
197. As Stephen Bainbridge has noted, recent judicial decisions interpreting
the business judgment rule have left open greater possibilities for judicial
intervention.

In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 350-51 (Del.

1993), the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to endorse a rebuttal of the
business judgment rule by showing a breach of the duty of care, rather than
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Broad managerial discretion is particularly important to some
businesses (and some managers), and these firms will want to
198
remove hindrances from the free exercise of business judgment.
Fiduciary duties are especially costly for certain types of investors,
such as those who are likely to have conflicts with other businesses
in which they own interests. 99 In addition, judicial review can
interfere with the internal relations among the firm's managers.200
Investors may also fear judicial error. Skepticism over whether
courts are reliable interpreters of contractual intent has received
increased attention in contracts scholarship. Eric Posner proposes
that many elements of our legal system may be understood as a
response to judicial error in the enforcement of contracts. 20 1 Courts

judicial abstention within certain decisional contexts. See Bainbridge, supra
note 195, at 127 ("If the business judgment rule is treated as a standard of
liability, rather than as an abstention doctrine, judicial intervention readily
could become the norm rather than the exception. This is why Technicolor is so
problematic."). Bainbridge's understanding of a business judgment rule based
on judicial abstention unless certain circumstances are shown (e.g., selfdealing), bears some resemblance to the treatment of absolute discretion terms
proposed in this Article. However, the exceptions to judicial abstention would
be fewer: fraud, misappropriation, and waste. The underlying standard of
conduct is also different: a fiduciary waiver alters the standard of conduct
required within the firm.
198. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Two "Cycles" of Venture Capital,28 J.
CORP. L. 419, 439 (2003) ("The modification of broad fiduciary duties allows the
venture capitalist the necessary freedom to make decisions on behalf of possibly
dozens of businesses in related areas without having to fear the possibility of
breaching his fiduciary duties to the investors of any single fund."). Doubts that
managers will be overcautious could exist for any firm, however. Bainbridge,
supra note 195, at 123 ("As long as there is some non-zero probability of
erroneous second-guessing by judges, however, the threat of liability will skew
director decision making away from optimal risk taking. That this result will
occur even if the risk of judicial error is quite small is suggested by the work of
behavioral economists on loss aversion and regret avoidance."); see also
Ribstein, UnincorporatedFirms, supra note 6, at 549 (explaining that the duty
of care may force a fiduciary to refrain from unduly risky conduct).
199. For a summary of other possible costs of fiduciary duties, depending on
the type of firm and investor, see Ribstein, UnincorporatedFirms, supra note 6,
at 548-50. Ribstein notes various ways in which features of the business
relation might justify a fiduciary waiver. The existence of specific categories in
which fiduciary duties are less desirable for the management of a business does
not mean that courts should pick and choose when to enforce fiduciary waivers
based upon apparent need, however. It is easy to conceive of advantages which
would be visible to the parties but not to courts.
200. See Bainbridge, supra note 195, at 124-27 (describing the disruptive
effects of sanctions on team behavior).
201. See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of

Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 749, 754 (2000) (assuming that
"parties lack the clairvoyance needed to give courts the proper guidance if a
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may not be very good at deterring opportunistic conduct, while the
parties are. °2 Posner suggests that there is "no evidence for the
modem conviction that judges can reliably determine intentions."2 2
As he notes: "Skepticism about the quality of judicial decisionmaking is reflected in many legal doctrines, including the business
judgment rule in corporate law, which restrains courts from secondguessing managers and directors, and the many contract law
doctrines that restrain courts from second-guessing parties to
contracts." °4
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott raise doubts over whether riskneutral parties should desire the incorporation of state-created
default terms into commercial contracts.
As they point out, the
vaguer a legal standard is, the more it is subject to opportunistic
abuse.20 6 Moral hazard arises under these conditions:
When a standard governs, the party who wants to behave
strategically must ask what a court will later do if the party is
sued. The vaguer the legal standard and the more that is at
stake, the more likely the party is to resolve doubts in its own
favor. A party that resolves doubts in this way will attempt to
maximize private gains at the expense of joint welfare
207
maximization.
Schwartz and Scott contend that where a "gap" exists which could
be filled by a standard, "the best inference for a decisionmaker to
dispute arises, and courts lack the genius that would be needed to enforce
contracts properly in the absence of such guidance").
202. Id. at 758. Posner proposes that parties enter into contracts with the
understanding that courts are able to deter certain high-value forms of
opportunism, however. Id. at 762.
203. Id. at 770.
204. Id. at 758.
205. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87, at 618-19 ("A default standard is
efficient only when parties can live with vague definitions of their contracting
obligations. Because standards confer considerable discretion on parties, a
standard will be unsatisfactory if, as a result of that discretion, parties are
likely to behave strategically under it."); see also id. at 608-09 ("It is appropriate
for courts to apply a default standard as long as that standard does not create
moral hazard.").
206. But cf. Triantis, supra note 172, at 1073-76 (2002) (offering
justifications for the uncertainty in vague terms). Also note that Delaware
limited partnerships and LLCs often adopt vague terms as part of their
allocation of duties within the firm. The existence of these standards indicates
the variety of potential judicial roles which parties might prefer.
207. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87, at 603. As noted supra note 172,
there may be circumstances when parties prefer a vague legal standard,
however. See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 20 (theorizing that vague
contract terms do not necessarily lead to higher litigation costs).
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draw is not that the standard is 'missing' from these contracts, but
rather that the standard has been rejected."2 8
Although Schwartz and Scott are writing about a different type
of agreement, their insights are relevant here. The indeterminacy of
fiduciary duties is well-known, and has long had proponents. 209 This

indeterminacy, however, suggests that judicial enforcement of
fiduciary duties-or even implied good faith standards-will not be
sufficiently predictable for some firms.210 Scott has noted "the
empirical condition that must be satisfied in order to pursue
successfully an activist strategy of ex post adjustment: informed and
capable courts and uninformed parties."2 1' These conditions do not
always arise in complex contracts, and certainly not in the case of
limited partnerships and LLCs.
Parties may anticipate several sources of unpredictability when
fiduciary duties are removed.
Courts cannot easily tell which
individual bargains•. produced
a text acceptable to all members of the
212
business organization.
Some courts will show a bias toward the
standard fiduciary-based defaults, even in light of contract language
212
that modifies those duties.
Other courts will instead try to make
208. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87, at 604.
209. As one commentator has noted:
The language expressing these [fiduciary] norms is aspirational and
studiously imprecise. The very ambiguity of the language conveys its
moral content as the court's refusal to set lines is designed to
discourage marginal conduct by making it difficult for a fiduciary to
determine the point at which self-serving conduct will be prohibited,
and thus to encourage conduct well within the borders.
Lawrence Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations,138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1675, 1696 (1990). Cf. Miller, supra note 2, at 1654 ("I have
suggested that the uncertainty of the law, and the corresponding specter of
judicial intervention, are not unfortunate consequences to be avoided by the
creation of a perfect statutory phrase or judicial test.").
210. Cf. Hynes, supra note 188, at 447 ("People may want to make such
agreements [restricting fiduciary duties] in order to avoid the risks of judicial
interference in this aspect of their relationship. As noted, fiduciary duties are
necessarily vague and open-ended, applying to a wide variety of relationships
and fact situations. Courts can sometimes misunderstand situations.").
211. Scott, supra note 184, at 865. As Scott notes, there is disagreement on
the extent to which this empirical condition exists.
212. This is so even given Delaware's notable expertise. Cf. Bainbridge,
supra note 195, at 120-21 (noting expertise acquired by Delaware courts in area
of corporate law). Even expert judges will not always be able to distinguish
breaches of fiduciary duty from permitted actions in cases where fiduciary
duties are reduced. Parties whose business calls for a different standard of
conduct could readily conclude that a more complete judicial abstention is the
safer bet.
213. Cf. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:
An Analysis of the Interactionsbetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73

20061

ELIMINATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES

an educated guess of the parties' intent, while still others will seek
what they consider the fairest result after the fact.
At the same time, contracting parties will often be able to limit
opportunism without resort to judicial enforcement. The availability
of alternative remedies lowers the risks associated with the
elimination of fiduciary duties.
Recent scholarship regarding
Delaware limited partnerships suggests that reputational concerns
play a major role in the extra-judicial enforcement of fiduciary-type
obligations, as do financial incentives.214
Venture capital firms, which frequently make use of the limited
partnership form, are characterized by the central role of reputation
as a constraint on the improper exercise of discretion. Venture
capital involves cycles: funds are raised, the investment proceeds,
investors receive capital from the venture, and the venture capitalist
raises new funds. 21'

At the end of the limited partnership's term,

investors reap their profits, and the process then repeats with the
formation of new limited partnerships. 6
Even though there are numerous opportunities for selfinterested behavior, venture capital firms often take advantage of
Delaware law to restrict fiduciary duties. 21 ' The lack of litigation in

this context may indicate that extrajudicial constraints are
sufficient to protect passive investors .2 8 Further, the parties to
these agreements can structure their obligations to invite judicial
oversight in those areas where it is needed.219
L. REV. 261, 263 (1985) ("[Tlhe courts' tendency to treat state-created rules
as presumptively fair often leads to judicial disapproval of efforts to vary
standard implied terms by agreement."); id. at 305 ("State support for the
entrenched forms produces an inherent, but unwarranted, institutional bias
against unconventional expression.").
214. See Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP.
L. 949, 969-72 (1999) (describing the importance of reputation for venture
capitalists). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 10 (exploring the importance
of reputation to venture capitalist investment funding).
CAL.

215. Id. at 371 (citing PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CYCLE 5 (2000)).

216. See id. at 371-72.
217. See id. at 369-72.
218. See id. at 372-73.
In addition, extralegal constraints may be
undermined by judicial intervention. Cf. Ribstein, The Structure of the
Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 24, at 35 (contending that "fiduciary-type
duties do not merely complement extra-legal incentives but may actually
weaken them") (citing Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation,149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1619 (2001)).

219. Evidence suggests that over time, parties to venture capital limited
partnerships focused only on areas where experience indicated selfish behavior
was likely. See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 392. Venture capital agreements
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In this regard, concerns with predictability may apply not only
to fiduciary duties, but also to contractual good faith duties.220
Fiduciary duties call for the utmost good faith and loyalty, occupying
one end of the spectrum of obligations within a firm. 22 1 The legal
significance of fiduciary duties is somewhat standardized with
respect to certain transactions, such as self-dealing transactions.222
The duty of good faith is harder to pin down because it occupies a
middle ground: substantively, good faith duties provide something
less than fiduciary duties, yet provide something greater than
223
caveat emptor.
In light of the concerns described above, there are legitimate
business reasons for contracting parties to agree to discretion that is
largely free of judicial oversight. 224 The replacement of fiduciary
duties with substantially less rigorous standards of behavior should
be understood in light of the relative costs and benefits of judicial
enforcement; by closing off implied contract terms through
sufficiently explicit language, contracting parties circumscribe the
role of courts.22 ' In short, even absolute discretion terms are

often provide for terms that amount to the duty of care, while curtailing the
duty of loyalty. See Rosenberg, supra note 198, at 434.
220. Cf DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes, supra note 6, at 1059-62 (suggesting
that good faith duties for LLCs might actually exceed the rigor of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty in some cases).
221. Fiduciary duty is often described as requiring the "utmost good faith."
Several commentators have noted the greater intensity of fiduciary obligation
when compared to contractual good faith duties. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 24,
at 1488-89; Coffee, supra note 5, at 1658-59. DeMott has also provided a
helpful comparison of the two types of duty in terms of case law. See DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor, supra note 5, at 892-908
222. For example, in cases of an interested transaction, Delaware courts will
reject the business judgment rule, instead applying an "entire fairness" analysis
which shifts the burden to the fiduciary party. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983).
223. See Mkt. Street Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir.
1991) (Posner, J.) ("This duty is, as it were, halfway between a fiduciary duty
(the duty of utmost good faith) and the duty merely to refrain from active fraud.
Despite its moralistic overtones it is no more the injection of moral principles
into contract law than the fiduciary concept itself is.").
224. An alternate means to avoid judicial intervention, with its own risks,
would be to add an arbitration clause. Delaware courts have shown a similar
readiness to respect contract terms which provide for arbitration in place of
litigation for LLCs. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 292
(Del. 1999) (applying the terms of an LLC agreement such that a derivative
action in Delaware Chancery Court would be unavailable because the parties
had chosen arbitration to resolve their dispute).
225. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 20 (discussing the role of contractual
rules and standards as a means of controlling litigation).
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226

rational, and for some parties they may be wise.
The recent statutory amendments suggest a demand for
business forms that permit the elimination of fiduciary duties.
Delaware
judges repeatedly,.227
emphasize the contractual flexibility of
LL~s
LLCs and limited partnerships.
The courts have also been explicit
about the interpretive consequences of choosing Delaware limited
partnerships and LLCs: the text is binding, and "effectively
constitutes the entire agreement among the partners. " 228 Despite
the risks to which parties are exposed when they eliminate fiduciary
duties, the option is apparently an appealing one.229

226. For an extended discussion of potential inefficiencies produced by nontextualist interpretive methods, see generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87;
Scott, supra note 184, at 853-58.
227. See Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998) (explaining
the appeal of Delaware limited partnerships in terms of modification to
fiduciary duties); Kahn v. Icahn, No. Civ. A. 15916, 1998 WL 832629, *2 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 10, 1998) ("This flexibility is precisely the reason why many choose
the limited partnership form in Delaware."); see also Rosenberg, supranote 198,
at 432.
Delaware courts emphasize the same flexibility for LLCs. The
Delaware Supreme Court recently cited the following as a template for LLCs:
Truly, the partnership agreement is the cornerstone of a Delaware
limited partnership, and effectively constitutes the entire agreement
among the partners with respect to the admission of partners to, and
the creation, operation and termination of, the limited partnership.
Once partners exercise their contractual freedom in their partnership
agreement, the partners have a great deal of certainty that their
partnership agreement will be enforced in accordance with its terms.
Jaffari, 727 A.2d at 291 (quoting MARTIN I. LUBAROFF & PAUL ALTMAN,
DELAwARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 1.2 (1999)). Although the quoted reference
involved limited partnerships, the court noted that the statutes for both
business entities provide for the same freedom of contract.
228. In Sonet v. Timber Co., for example, the chancery court rejected an
analysis based upon a "highly generalized interest of equity" and declared:
[U]nder Delaware limited partnership law a claim of breach of
fiduciary duty must first be analyzed in terms of the operative
governing instrument-the partnership agreement-and only where
that document is silent or ambiguous, or where principles of equity
are implicated, will a Court begin to look for guidance from statutory
default rules, traditional notions of fiduciary duties, or other extrinsic
evidence.
722 A.2d at 324.
229. Cf. DeMott, supra note 169, at 491-92 (describing the benefits of
mandatory fiduciary duties in terms of standardized terms that reduce the need
for particularized investigations).
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V.
INTENT SKEPTICISM AND JUDICIAL COMPETENCE: TEXTUALISM
AS THE MOST RELIABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THE PARTIES' INTENT

A. JudicialInterpretationsof HypotheticalBargainsare
Unreliablein Fiduciary Waiver Cases
The ability to correctly divine the parties' intent is an integral
goal of interpretive doctrine.230 Fiduciary waivers, however, raise
daunting problems for an ex post assessment of these intentions, at
least to the extent that those intentions are independent of the
explicit text. The creation of appropriate default terms can be
difficult, especially where the goal is to ascertain what the parties
would have done if they had expressly addressed the subject of their
231
dispute.
In many cases where fiduciary duties are eliminated, an
implicit contractual understanding respecting contingent events will
be unverifiable.
As noted, Delaware treats the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as a contractual gap-filler.3 2 If an agreement is silent on an
issue under dispute, the courts apply a hypothetical bargain
analysis to determine the content of implied terms. 23 This method
seeks to provide terms the parties would have chosen ex ante in a
world with no transaction costs.23
The appropriate content of hypothetical bargains is
controversial, however, even when judges broadly agree on a
hypothetical bargain methodology. 2 5 As David Charny has noted,
230. Cf. Scott, supra note 184, at 865-66 ("What, then, is the most efficacious
role for state regulation in a thick environment of many heterogeneous parties

who enter into subtly complex, but incomplete, relational contracts? Both
heterogeneity of contracting behavior and heterogeneity of contracting parties
argue for a single-minded insistence on preserving the quality of the signals
used by contracting parties to allocate risk.").
231. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract & FiduciaryDuty, supra note 3, at
445 ("Creating hypothetical contracts is difficult. Judges have less information
than the parties. Although judges can examine the contracts people have
reached when the stakes were high enough to overcome the transaction costs,
big-stakes negotiations may be special cases rather than models on which to
base presumptive rules for other parties.").
232. See DuPont v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443 (Del. 1996); PAMI-LEMB I
Inc. v. EMB-NHC, L.L.C., 857 A.2d 998, 1016 (Del. Ch. 2004).
233. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986).
234. An effort to provide a tailored result-what the parties would have
chosen-will frequently be as difficult as majoritarian hypothetical bargain
analysis. The intent as to undescribed contingencies will in many cases be
unknowable.
235. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987). In
that case, both Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner held the same view that
fiduciary duties are "a standby or off-the-rack guess about what parties would
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there are a range of different approaches:
I: Choose the best rule for this transaction type (general and
idealizing);
II: Choose the rule that these particular parties most likely
would have negotiated to (particular and nonidealizing);
III: Choose the rule that parties in this situation would have
chosen if they were rational and perfectly informed (particular
and idealizing);
IV: Choose the rule that parties to this transaction type would
most likely choose in the general run of situations (general and
nonidealizing). 6
Which option is chosen may depend upon the court's goals as far as
individual autonomy, reciprocity within the agreement, economic
efficiency, and other instrumental effects of the chosen default
rule.237 None of these approaches provides an easy answer where

agree to if they dickered about the subject explicitly." Id. at 436, 446-47.
However, they reached very different conclusions about the applicability of that
duty on this basis. Id. at 446-47. This disagreement has been used to challenge
the validity of the hypothetical bargain method for determining the scope of
fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 1681 ("Jordan suggests that
hypothetical bargaining supplies only a vague and shifting guide."); DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor, supra note 5, at 885 (arguing against hypothetical bargain
conception in Jordan and noting "[tihat two opinions, applying the same
conception of fiduciary obligation, reach opposite conclusions on identical facts
is a good reason to examine their initial premise"); see also Ayres & Gertner,
supra note 158, at 117-18 (using the Jordan case as evidence that the "costs of
determining what the particular parties would have contracted for can be
significant."); cf. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 30-31 n.129 (suggesting
that Judge Easterbrook applied a hypothetical bargain approach, while Judge
Posner applied the actual contract).
236. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of

ContractInterpretation,89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1821 (1991). Courts might also
choose minoritarian defaults. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999)
(suggesting contexts in which the efficient default rule will not be based on
majoritarian preferences). Note also that a majoritarian default may run
counter to the preferences of a large subgroup within the contracting majority.
Cf. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 158, at 116-17. At times, courts select
interpretations of contracts designed to force information from a more
knowledgeable party, or protect parties with less power in the contractual
relationship. See id. at 107.
237. See Charny, supra note 236, at 1823-24.
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fiduciary duties have been eliminated.23 8
In many long term relational contracts, a fully contingent
contract is prohibitively expensive.239 Parties hope a court will fill
any gaps for them, but never think through which terms would be
desirable. 240 The structure of the agreement could reflect a
compromise from which no clear theme can be discerned, or a
contractual gap may be a strategic effort by one or more parties to
shift costs to the courts and their fellow investors.2 41 The desires of
the individual parties might simply be in conflict, and the gap exists
because it was easier to leave that conflict unresolved.242
What does the decision to eliminate fiduciary duties indicate
about party preferences? Should the court ask how the parties
would likely expect particular language to be interpreted as a
semantic matter?
Or should it ask whether the outcome of
particular interpretations would be deemed desirable by the parties?
Which parties among the various investors should the court focus
on? Would the parties think their contract was complete? What if
the parties
never reached a majority understanding of the language
243
at issue?
238. Arguably, ex post adjustment of the contract to comport with fairness

would be an alternative that does not focus on the more difficult efficiency and
intent issues. However, this approach is inconsistent with the maximum
freedom of contract, for reasons developed infra notes 220-21. It also suffers
from a great deal of indeterminacy. For authorities critiquing the subjective
nature of ex post fairness analyses, see supra note 188; see also Randy E.
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLuM L. REV. 269, 284 (1986)

[hereinafter Barnett, A Consent Theory] ("A substantive fairness theory
assumes that a standard of value can be found by which the substance of any
agreement can be objectively evaluated. Such a criterion has yet to be
articulated and defended."). Barnett notes that fairness standards provide
neither meaningful criteria nor predictable results. Id. at 285.
239. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational

Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981) ("[A] complete contingent contact
may not be a feasible contracting mechanism. Where the future contingencies
are peculiarly intricate or uncertain, practical difficulties arise that impede the
contracting parties' efforts to allocate optimally all risks at the time of
contracting.").
240. For a helpful analysis of potential causes for incompleteness, see
Clayton P. Gillette, Cooperation and Convention in ContractualDefaults, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 170 n.8 (1993) (citing Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial
Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 278-81 (1992)).

241. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 158, at 93-94.
242. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533,
540 (1983) ("The cornerstone of many a compromise is the decision, usually
unexpressed, to leave certain issues unresolved.").
243. An in-depth analysis of the many questions which might be asked when
trying to determine hypothetical bargains is set forth in Charny, supra note
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Whichever interpretive option is chosen, hard questions arise,
in part because there are often more than two parties to a limited
partnership or LLC. The incentives will differ among the parties
within the agreement, including the incentives to compromise, be
informed, or litigate.
In a limited partnership or LLC that
represents the interests of a variety of different players, it will be
difficult to discern what they would have expected as a group (or as
subgroups).2" The existence of compromises between individual
parties is hard to determine, and the ultimate agreement may not
reflect the preferences of any one party.
Further, these problems are exacerbated if the contract was
created by parties with a range of sophistication. Cognitive biasboth ex ante and ex post-could affect the interpretation of the
agreement."' The potential for differing levels of risk aversion also
adds to the confusion. 246 An identical set of contract terms, if drafted
by different authors, might produce a distinct set of hypothetical
bargains.24 7
226. See also DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 5, at 889-90 ("If [the
hypothetical bargain] is an approximation of something that particular parties
would have agreed to, the content of the bargain will, like actual bargains,
reflect many factors, including the scarcity of the subject matter of the bargain,
the parties' relative skills in negotiation, and their relative degrees of aversion
to risks of varied sorts.").
244. For a useful example of how there may be no majority preference within
a group, see Einer Elhauge, Preference-EstimatingStatutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2076-78 (2002).
245. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias
and ContractDefault Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). On hindsight bias
in judging, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging
in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (analyzing the tendency when
judging to conclude that events are predictable, when they were not foreseeable
ex ante). Rachlinski notes that the business judgment rule is one method of
limiting hindsight bias. Id. at 619. Eliminating fiduciary duties is another way
of addressing hindsight bias.
246. Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of
Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 535, 574 (1990) ("[Olnce we
relax assumptions about risk-neutral decision makers who seek to maximize
expected utility, we cannot readily discern a majoritarian default rule of
cooperation or egoism from a general investigation into risk attitudes.
Transactional structures provide some hints but also suffer from sufficient
ambiguity to preclude an authoritative default rule based on the parties'
intent.").
247. Cf.Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and FiduciaryDuty, supra note 3,
at 445 ("Creating hypothetical contracts is difficult.
Judges have less
information than the parties. Although judges can examine the contracts
people have reached when the stakes were high enough to overcome the
transaction costs, big-stakes negotiations may be special cases rather than
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These quandaries do not mean that courts are unable to
ascertain any intentions: the intention to adopt a particular
contractual text is typically clear. For some agreements, that
textual choice will be the one intent known to be shared by all
contracting parties. In such cases, a textualist approach will
decrease the risk of rewriting the parties' agreement after the fact,
and may actually approximate the parties' ex ante preferences. 2
Statutory interpretation provides a useful analogue for this
analysis. 249 Like an LLC or limited partnership, Congress is a
"they," not an "it."250 Though legislatures function as single entities,

the group that enacts a law is comprised of individual personalities,
with individual preferences and understandings. Complexities of
the legislative process mean that the text of a statute may not
reflect any individual's preferences, and the inherent difficulty of
251
defining
group intent
makes legislative
intentofan
concept.
Textualists
are appropriately
skeptical
theobscure
verifiability
of an

models on which to base presumptive rules for other parties. Real transactions,
at real prices, are accordingly preferable.").
248. See Scott, supra note 184, at 861-62 ("[W]hile a modest legal role may
appear to be the admission of defeat in resolving the dilemma of relational
contracts, in fact, it may be precisely what contracting parties would prefer
courts to do.").
249. Arguably, contract interpretation and statutory interpretation are
sufficiently different that it is questionable to borrow methods from one field for
use in the other. As one commentator has noted:
Textualism in statutory interpretation is often supported on the
theory that the collective intent of a legislature is simply unknowable.
The only intent which can be deduced with certainty is that the
legislators intended to vote on a text which would have the force of
law. Contracts, in theory, are different.
Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of
the ContractAnalogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1184-85

(1998). An examination of limited partnership and LLC contracts, however,
turns up a number of similarities to legislation. As described above, the group
intent within these business entities is often inscrutable. In addition, LLC and
limited partnership agreements are more directly relevant to third parties, and
consequently filed with the state. It is not uncommon for new investors to join
the business in reliance on these terms. These new members cannot be
expected to gather all of the evidence of prior negotiations when making their
investment decision. This formality suggests that the formative agreement is
what the parties actually intend as their agreement.
250. This coinage is from Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an
"It":Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
251. On the philosophical difficulties in determining group intent for
legislation, see Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 (1990).
But cf. JOHN R. SEARLE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE 90-105 (2002)

(describing a theory of collective intent).
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overarching legislative intent. 252
semantic meaning:

Their approach is to focus on

[Tiextualists deny that a legislature has any shared intention
that lies behind but differs from the reasonable import of the
words adopted; that is, they think it impossible to tell how the
body as a whole actually intended (or, more accurately, would
have intended) to resolve a policy question not clearly or
satisfactorily settled by the text.253
Due to the impossibility of determining legislative intent beyond the
chosen words, textualists look to the statutory language itself. In
context, this meaning is verifiable.254
Textualists interpret the objective meaning of the text as
equivalent to the intent of the legislature.2 5 5 As John Manning has
explained:
[Tiextualism might be understood as a judgment about the
most reliable (or perhaps the least unreliable) way of
discerning legislative instructions. If one cannot accurately
ascertain what the body as a whole would have done with
matters unspecified or even misspecified by the text, then
perhaps the best one can do is to approximate the way a
reasonable person in the legislator's position would have read
the words actually adopted.256
252. Much of the modern skepticism comes from public choice theory, which
has described how statutes may reflect compromises among the textual goals of
competing interest groups. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of
Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARv. L. REV.

1328, 1346-47 (1994). Based on Arrow's Theorem, proponents also contend that
the preferences of individual legislators cannot be collected into a coherent
choice. For a detailed discussion of the different bases of textualists' intent
skepticism, see Manning, supra note 183, at 2408-19. In addition to the
procedural complexities, historicist concerns also arise. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 644-46 (1990)

(questioning whether legislative intent can ever be reconstructed after the fact).
253. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REv. 419,
430 (2005).

254. See Manning, supra note 183, at 2396-97 ("[Clontemporary theories of
textual interpretation more plausibly build on Wittgenstein's premise that
language is intelligible by virtue of a community's shared conventions for
understanding words in context. Starting from that assumption, one can deem
particular interpretations of words in context correct or incorrect as measured
by the relevant interpretive community's practices.").
255. See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)
("[Clourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there.").
256. See Manning, supra note 253, at 433.
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Limited partnership and LLC agreements pose similar problems of
inscrutability. In many cases, the best that courts can do in
interpreting an agreement that eliminates fiduciary duties may be
to approximate the way that a reasonable person in the position of
the parties would read the words they adopted.257 The primary
intent that textualists are concerned with is the intent to adopt the
language before the court.
Treating contract terms as complete-i.e., assuming an
objective reading of the text of the contract indicates completeness,
as in the case of an absolute discretion term--does not eliminate the
duty of good faith.2 8 The duty of good faith is relevant to an
otherwise "complete" contract when a literal reading of the
contract's terms would not make sense.
Textualists are not
literali ts.29 Context often rules out absurd understandings of
26 °
language.
Just as the absurdity doctrine is a limitation on the literal
meaning of statutory language, contractual absurdities should also
257. Cf. Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 87, at 882 ("Given that a
default rule reflecting the commonsense expectations within the relevant
community of discourse is likely to satisfy the parties' intentions as well (in the
case of a true gap) or better (in the case where shared tacit subjective
assumptions are present) than any rival default rule, there is a strong reason to
prefer it."). Here, too, the legislative analysis is instructive. See Manning,
supra note 183, at 2397-98 ("Even without knowing the speaker's actual intent
or purpose in making a statement, one can charge the speaker with the
minimum intention 'to say what one would ordinarily be understood as saying,
given the circumstances in which one said it."') (citing Joseph Raz, Intention in
Interpretation,in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIvISM 249, 268
(Robert George ed., 1996)). See also Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions
and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 329, 339 (Andrei

Marmor ed., 1995) ("A legislator who votes for (or against) a provision like 'No
vehicle shall be permitted to enter any state or municipal park' does so on the
assumption that-to put it crudely-what the words mean to him is identical to
what they will mean to those to whom they are addressed....").
258. Cf. Van Alstine, supra note 79, at 1224 ("[Mlodern celebration of the
authority of text threatens to consign the doctrine of good faith to an
inconsequential marginal note in the law of contracts."). Van Alstine's concern,
however, is aimed at the view that "every expressly conferred contractual power
is presumptively absolute and unrestricted." Id. The subject of the present
Article is a contract term that expressly states that it is absolute.
259. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 253, at 434-35; see also SCALIA, supra
note 183, at 24 ("The good textualist is not a literalist. .. ").
260. Cf. Manning, supra note 183, at 2461 ("This aspect of modern
textualism will not, of course, eliminate all circumstances that existing doctrine
might label as absurdities. But because people typically try to choose words to
effect their desired ends, textual interpretation that accounts for contextual
social usage, including colloquial usage, should eliminate the most egregious
cases of absurdity.").
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be avoided. 26 ' This comports with the ordinary use of language,
which excludes highly improbable meanings from the typical
reader's understanding.
The duty of good faith functions in this
fashion even where a discretion-granting term does not otherwise
have a "gap."26'
Recall that courts applying good faith doctrine look for what
must have been contemplated by the parties, in light of their
agreement. 26' A broad grant of discretion is confined by a reasonable
understanding of the text as a whole. If the parties adopted contract
terms that indicate that what appears to be an absurd result was
nevertheless contemplated, courts should follow the literal meaning
of the text.26' Otherwise, the duty of good faith is relevant to

261. See, e.g., Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 860
(7th Cir. 2002) ("[A] contract will not be interpreted literally if doing so would
produce absurd results, in the sense of results that the parties, presumed to be
rational persons pursuing rational ends, are very unlikely to have agreed to
seek."); FutureSource LLC v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 284-85 (7th Cir. 2002)
("Nonsensical interpretations of contracts, as of statutes, are disfavored. Not
because of a judicial aversion to nonsense as such, but because people are
unlikely to make contracts, or legislators statutes, that they believe will have
absurd consequences.") (citations omitted).
262. See Beanstalk Group, Inc., 283 F.3d at 860 (explaining that avoidance
of absurdities in contractual interpretation is an interpretive principle based
upon linguistic and cultural context). Arguably, Judge Posner's readiness to
look to practical context as an additional source of meaning is mistaken, see id.
at 864 (Rovner, J., dissenting in part), but the linguistic point is correct.
Language is used in context, and that context may render particular
applications of discretion absurd.
263. For example, people do not generally enter into limited partnership or
LLC agreements with donative intent. See DeMott, FiduciaryPreludes, supra
note 6, at 1061 ("[I]t strains credulity excessively to characterize membership in
an LLC or a limited partnership, once formed, as indicative of intention to
execute a gift transaction."). Thus, it would be an unreasonable interpretation
of an LLC agreement to find that absolute discretion permitted an LLC
manager to misappropriate the assets of other members of the firm.
264. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d at 1351,
1357 (7th Cir. 1990).
265. See Beanstalk Group, Inc., 283 F.3d at 860 (noting permissibility of
absurd contract terms where it is clear that the absurdity was intended). See
also R.I. Charities Trust v. Engelhard Corp., 267 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2001)
("True, parties can contract for preposterous terms. If contract language is
crystal clear or there is independent extrinsic evidence that something silly was
actually intended, a party may be held to its bargain, absent some specialized
defense."). There are some limits to this principle. If the contractual text were
read to permit misappropriation of assets, it could raise concerns under the
doctrine of consideration (not to mention public policy). Cf. DeMott, Fiduciary
Preludes, supra note 6, at 1060-61 (questioning the enforceability of an LLC
contract that does not contemplate mutuality of obligation).
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interpreting the scope of a manager's discretion.266
As an example, consider a manager of an LLC who is granted
absolute discretion to make certain categories of decisions under an
agreement that waives fiduciary duties. This absolute discretion
clause would permit self-dealing transactions if the transactions fall
within the clause's coverage, despite the risks they pose, as
interested transactions are not beyond contemplation when the duty
of loyalty is expressly replaced by absolute discretion. 6

'

A provision

to engage in self-dealing transactions is not irrational or absurd;
such transactions could readily be contemplated. In effect, the
business judgment rule would expand to protect discretionary
choices even where the manager had a conflict of interest.
However, if the manager exercises her powers to misappropriate
the assets of the minority or engages in fraud, it is hard to imagine
that the parties could have contemplated such an exercise of
discretion, even by a nonfiduciary. An implied term precluding
misappropriation or fraud would follow from the parties' agreement,
despite the fact that no such term is expressly stated.268 The
prohibition on fraud or misappropriation reflects the presumed
meaning of the text, based on context; it would be irrational to enter
an agreement where someone can steal your assets or defraud you.
Similarly, waste of assets, narrowly defined, also raises the
specter of absurd results.269 In the corporate context, Delaware law
266. Cf. Chamison v. HealthTrust, Inc., 735 A.2d 912, 920 (Del. Ch. 1999)
("[A] party to a contract has made an implied covenant to interpret and to act
reasonably upon contractual language that is on its face reasonable.").
267. Cf. Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 320 (Del. Ch. 1998) (rejecting
claim that amounted to self-dealing in light of partnership agreement's
modification of fiduciary duties).
268. Cf. Walker v. Resource Dev. Co., 791 A.2d 799, 817 (Del. Ch. 2000)
("[Tihe legislature never intended a statutory provision [permitting good faith
reliance on the terms of an operating agreement] to allow the members of an
LLC to misappropriate property from another member and avoid returning that
property or otherwise compensating the wronged member."). This reasoning
should not be confused with the idea that poor business judgments, even
irrational ones, are therefore examples of bad faith. Cf. In re Caremark Int'l
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). Rather, implied terms
would not be appropriate as limitations on absolute discretion unless those
terms are necessary to avoid an absurd or irrational scope of the discretion
term.
269. As the Delaware Supreme Court has noted, courts applying the
business judgment rule do not inquire into substantive due care. See Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (noting that the concept "is foreign to the
business judgment rule"). Corporate waste typically applies in situations where
there is a transfer of assets for no corporate purpose, or which amounts to a gift.
Id. at 263. As the Court explained, "[i]rrationality may be the functional
equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made
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limits actions for waste to unconscionable cases, where "directors
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets."27 °
The
business judgment rule does not apply where acts of discretion go
"so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems
essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith."2 7'
Irrational acts of this sort are just as inexplicable for nonfiduciary
managers of a firm as they are for fiduciaries.
B.
Textualism Increases the Clarity of Obligationsfor NonFiduciaryFirms
Textualism in this context also permits an expansion of the
menu of standardized terms available to the business community.
For example, an absolute discretion term carves out broad
categories of predictably unreviewable conduct. 272 Likewise, a term
that expressly permits a specific type of nonfiduciary conduct, such
as a term that permits transactions in competition with the firm,
provides foreseeable results. The meaning of these provisions is
clear, if courts follow the objective meaning of their language.
Predictability is more attainable as categories of acceptable (and
unacceptable) conduct for non-fiduciaries develop established
judicial interpretations.2 7 3 Standardized meanings enable the firm's
owners to retain fiduciary duties in various contexts, while safely
carving out other areas free of litigation risk.274 In contrast, these
in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule." Id. at
264.
270. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.
271. See Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999)
(citing In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
272. For an argument that the good faith doctrine may not be defined under
a unified theory, see Summers, supranote 62, at 201.
273. Cf. Scott, supra note 184, at 866 ("[Ilnsofar as courts pursuing this
[plain meaning and parol evidence rule] strategy authoritatively interpret
commonly used express terms, a formalist approach to interpretation would
advance the standardization norm by expanding the established menu of legally
blessed standard-form terms and clauses.").
274. The use of fiduciary restrictions that are limited to specific areas of
discretion is already well established. This is typical in the case of venture
capital firms. See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 392 (discussing the evolution of
partnership agreements that focused on areas which experience had shown
presented opportunities for selfish behavior). Contracts that combine specific
and vague terms (in this case, including absolute discretion), enable parties to
manage litigation risks in specifically tailored ways. Cf. Scott & Triantis, supra
note 20, at 35 ("Parties adopt standards with superior knowledge of the context
of their contractual relationship, and, as we have seen, generally in combination
with specific contractual rules. Moreover, when standards are appropriate, the
parties can always include them in their contract at relatively low cost. The
courts, therefore, are wise to interpret the absence of vague standards in
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meanings would be slower to develop if the terms of agreements are
routinely modified
by a hypothetical bargain analysis or a judicial
75
fairness inquiry.

Standardized terms make it easier to draft agreements, to
predict judicial interpretation, and develop familiarity with the
terms within the legal community.276 Established terms also provide
ongoing benefits while a contract is performed. 2 77 A widely-used
term will provide efficiencies during the course of the agreement as
the term is put to continued use, allowing for reliance on a
predictable meaning. 278 Objective interpretation of opt-out language
thus has advantages over an ad hoc application of good faith
standards to the extent it allows parties to determine areas in which
implied good faith standards will be inapplicable. 9
The interests of third parties also support a textualist
interpretation of discretion-granting terms.
Other limited
partnerships and LLCs benefit from standardized terms already in
use, as do creditors and third party entrants to the business

particular cases as instructions from the parties to abstain from proxy choice
and to limit their construction to the specific terms of the contract.").
275. See Scott, supra note 184, at 868 (noting with respect to contextualized
interpretations that "the fact-specific nature of the contract dispute leaves, in
virtually every case, little opportunity for subsequent incorporation of
interpretations as default terms suitable for other contracting parties").
276. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 213; see also Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Standardizationand Innovation in Corporate Contracting
(Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-20 (1997).

277. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 276, at 725-27 (describing
advantages to use of a term that is contemporaneously used by many firms for a
significant period of time).
278. See id. (distinguishing learning benefits, which exist "when a particular
firm adopts a term," from network benefits, "developed during the time the firm
has the term in its contract"). Standardized terms may also limit "switching
costs," with potential benefits to a firm based on internal practices, when it can
reuse the same terms. See id. at 727-29. Admittedly, it might be more efficient
for parties to stick with a suboptimal term than to change to a novel term in
some cases. See Michael Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, and Networks

of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (describing network effects and the
potential for suboptimal contracts). However, the argument that standardized
terms will be suboptimal arguably supports retaining the interpretive
differences that exist between corporations and limited partnerships or LLCs.
In a broad sense, these different forms provide parties with a menu of potential
standardized terms. Cf id. at 839-41 (proposing menus of standardized terms
as a means of providing optimal terms).
279.

Cf. DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 169, at 491 ("Even if

fiduciary norms are distinctive, what justifies the mandatory imposition of any
fiduciary rule? First, mandatory rules supply standardized content for the legal
consequences of relationships.").
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relationship. 2 ° Third party rights are substantially affected by the
predictability of judicial interpretations of intra-firm obligations, but
as with courts, third parties are not in a position to readily access
the background negotiations that produced the express terms.
The value of an investment to third parties will change
depending upon the clarity and content of a firm's internal
governance provisions; different levels of intra-firm obligations alter
the investment. In addition, the enforcement of fiduciary duties
sometimes invalidates agreements with third parties when such
duties are grounded on a violation of the firm management's
responsibilities."' The enforcement of good faith duties could have a
similar effect on settled contractual expectations. An ability to
discern the scope of intra-firm obligations from the text of an
agreement serves to protect these third party interests.
Furthermore, textualism creates an incentive to draft contracts
with clarity.282 As Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner note: 'When
parties fail to contract because they want to shift the ex ante
transaction cost to a subsidized ex post court determination, a
penalty default of non-enforcement may be appropriate."2 82
A
penalty default is a default interpretation that discourages parties
from an inefficient creation of contractual gaps. 28 4 The default
interpretation is not designed to reflect a hypothetical bargain of the
parties, but rather to create contracting incentives to avoid the
default.
In this context, the cost of contractually avoiding an unwanted
280. Cf. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 276, at 723-24 (describing benefits of
terms that have been used in the past for assessment by various third parties,
including lawyers, accountants, and investors).
281. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in
CorporateLaw: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. LAW. 1,

23-26 (2003) (describing the impact of recent Delaware case law limiting the
power of boards to enter agreements that lock up an acquisition without a
fiduciary opt-out); cf. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS HealthCare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914
(Del. 2003); see also Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law
Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 1 (1999); cf.
John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, An Economic Analysis of Shared Property
in Partnershipand Close CorporationsLaw, 26 J. CORP. L. 983, 997 (2001).
282. Cf. Scott, The Case for Formalism, supra note 184, at 866 ("A rigorous

application of the common-law plain meaning and parol evidence rules would
preserve the value of predictable interpretation and encourage parties to take
precautions in selecting terms with well-defined meanings.").
283. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 158, at 127-28 (emphasis added).
284. See id. at 97 ("Penalty defaults, by definition, give at least one party to
the contract an incentive to contract around the default. From an efficiency
perspective, penalty default rules can be justified as a way to encourage the
production of information. The very process of 'contracting around' can reveal
information to parties inside or outside the contract.").
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textualist interpretation of an agreement is limited. Investors that
wish for the standard fiduciary limits on discretion can choose to
leave the standard default terms in place. In that case, the fiduciary
duties of loyalty, care, and good faith will be inserted by the courts.
Alternatively, some might wish for judicial intervention, but less
stringent intervention than the common law of fiduciary duties
provides. It is comparatively simple for such parties to draft a
contract that substitutes a rigorous standard of behavior, or simply
modifies preexisting fiduciary obligations where needed.
Judicial resources are conserved to the extent interpretation
does not require a complex (and potentially obscure) hypothetical
bargain analysis."' Textualist interpretation in the fiduciary optout context should provide incentives for clarity in the drafting of
contractual text.
VI.

MANDATORY DUTIES ARE UNNECESSARY TO PROTECT
MEMBERS OF LLCS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

Despite the benefits, fiduciary waivers raise concerns that
unsophisticated investors will fail to realize what they are getting
into.8 6 In light of the potential for opportunism, commentators have
expressed fears that fiduciary waivers will harm unwitting
287
parties.
People are presumed not to put themselves (or their
assets) entirely at the mercy of others, and allowing a complete
elimination of the fiduciary relationship looks suspect from this
perspective.2 8 8 Not all investors are sophisticated.

285. See id. at 93 ("If it is costly for the courts to determine what the parties
would have wanted, it may be efficient to choose a default rule that induces the
parties to contract explicitly. In other words, penalty defaults are appropriate
when it is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term ex ante than for the courts
to estimate ex post what the parties would have wanted. Courts, which are
publicly subsidized, should give parties incentives to negotiate ex ante by
penalizing them for inefficient gaps.").
286. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2, at 1620 ("Depending on the extent to
which it [the contractarian vision] fails to consider the interests of the less
sophisticated and less financially privileged small entrepreneurs who may not
be well represented by legal counsel, the contractarian model may be
positioning certain LLC members at an initial disadvantage that is impossible
to surmount."); see also Dickerson, supra note 5; Frankel, supra note 5.
287. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2, at 1619-20; see also DeMott, Fiduciary
Preludes, supra note 6, at 1044-45 ("[In closely held firms, participants may not
fully explore in contractual negotiations the downside risks of their future
association; the participants may be unable to identify all of the contingencies
that would enable opportunistic conduct or, having identified such possibilities,
may be reluctant to articulate them because they fear destroying the deal
underway.").
288. Cf. DeMott, Fiduciary Precludes, supra note 6, at 1061 ("It strains
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Several aspects of limited partnership and LLC agreements
should ameliorate these concerns.
The nature of a limited
partnership should encourage parties to seek legal advice.289 In
addition, closely held firms are different from public corporationsthey are often the subject of real negotiation for investors. 9 '
Moreover, when members of limited partnerships and LLCs choose
to restrict fiduciary default terms, they have an incentive to detail
the rights and obligations that affect their relationship. 29 1 These
customized agreements allow the parties to limit the risk of
managerial abuses.
The process of opting out of fiduciary duties involves several
decisions.
Before adopting language that eliminates fiduciary
duties, the contracting parties must adopt a particular jurisdiction
and business form as a starting point. 92 The decision to form a
limited partnership or LLC is a choice to adopt a business structure
known for its freedom of contract, in comparison to a corporation or
a general partnership.292 In effect, by choosing these business forms,
with their demonstrated contractual implications, the parties have

credulity excessively to characterize membership in an LLC or a limited
partnership, once formed, as indicative of intention to execute a gift
transaction.").
289. See Ribstein, Limited PartnershipAgreements, supra note 6, at 942

(explaining, in light of the typical uses of limited partnerships, and the fact that
limited partnerships are not likely to be publicly traded, that "the limited
partnership form itself serves as a caution flag that should induce users to get
legal advice, and that reduces the justification for protecting those who do not
do so").
290. See Ribstein, Unincorporated Firms, supra note 6, at 550 ("The

antiwaiver argument is a harder sell in most closely held unincorporated firms
in which terms are often negotiated or voted on face-to-face and approved
unanimously.").
291. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 382 (describing how venture capital
limited partnerships waive default fiduciary duties, but replace them with
detailed provisions intended to address specific types of opportunistic behavior).
292. Cf. Eggleston, et al., supra note 175, at 131 ("If parties think their
contract (whether simple or complex) would be best interpreted by a strict
court, then they can opt for a strict court by placing an appropriate term in the
contract; alternatively, they can opt for a liberal court."). A choice of Delaware,
or a similar jurisdiction, and of contract-based business entities, is also a choice
of interpretive mode.
293. Cf. Ribstein, Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 6, at 942

("[T]he limited partnership form itself serves as a caution flag that should
induce users to get legal advice, and that reduces the justification for protecting
those who do not do so."). Although Ribstein distinguishes LLCs from limited
partnerships, based on the passivity of limited partners, the contractual
freedom of the LLC form still provides a signal when combined with a fiduciary
waiver.
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opted into a textualist mode of interpretation.
The language that eliminates fiduciary duties is also a
cautionary signal.2 5 When a party negotiates a contract and
announces he would like to completely eliminate fiduciary duties
from the relationship, it is a wake up call to his partners. Investors
may choose to ignore these signals, but they don't enter into
fiduciary waivers without warning. 96 Indeed, even if fiduciary
waivers were commonplace, replacement of fiduciary duties with
distinctly different obligations, such as a grant of absolute discretion
or the right to compete with the firm, should wave a red flag.
Finally, the common law includes substantial interpretive
safeguards against an unknowing waiver of fiduciary duties. 97 An
established interpretive rule prevents opting out of fiduciary duties
unless the parties have done so unambiguously. 298

In

effect,

Delaware courts apply a clear statement rule to prevent inadvertent
294. Contracting parties may have preferences not only as to the terms
contained within their agreement, but also respecting the interpretive
methodology a court adopts. Cf Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87, at 569 ("[T]he
issue is not what interpretive style is best calculated to yield the correct
answer. Rather the issue is what interpretive style would typical parties want
courts to use when attempting to find the correct answer.").
295. See Hynes, supra note 5, at 45 ("The very suggestion by the fiduciary
that the customary protections be drafted away would serve as a warning that
something is wrong. At that point, an investigation into character would indeed
be triggered, but under such circumstances it would be cost effective because it
would redound to the benefit of the party who is about to place trust in someone
who has sent a signal that all may not be well.").
296. For a particularly blunt statement to this effect, see Miller v. American
Real Estate Partners,L.P., No. Civ. A. 16788, 2001 WL 1045643, *8 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 6, 2001) ("[[T]he court] will not be tempted by the piteous pleas of limited
partners who are seeking to escape the consequences of their own decisions to
become investors in a partnership whose general partner has clearly exempted
itself from traditional fiduciary duties.").
297. See Ribstein, Limited PartnershipAgreements, supra note 6, at 948
("Even clear fiduciary duty waivers do not necessarily cover all potential
fiduciary breaches. Courts understandably hold that conduct outside the
waiver is covered by default fiduciary duties.").
298. As one Delaware court recently noted in the limited partnership
context:
[J]ust as investors must use due care, so must the drafter of a
partnership agreement who wishes to supplant the operation of
traditional fiduciary duties. In view of the great freedom afforded to
such drafters and the reality that most publicly traded limited
partnerships are governed by agreements drafted exclusively by the
original general partner, it is fair to expect that restrictions on
fiduciary duties be set forth clearly and unambiguously. A topic as
important as this should not be addressed coyly.
Miller, 2001 WL 1045643 at *8.
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waivers, creating a presumption that fiduciary duties have been
retained unless there is clear text to the contrary.
In those cases where it is clear that fiduciary duties have been
eliminated, courts read the waiver narrowly. The agreement must
not only unambiguously eliminate fiduciary duties, but eliminate
them with respect to the exercise of discretion at issue. Courts
readily find that fiduciary duties are retained in one area even
though they are removed in another. 299

The doctrine of contra

proferentum, which states that agreements are interpreted against
the drafter, adds further protection. 300
In some cases, a more sophisticated party will take advantage of
a less sophisticated one, but traditional contract doctrines offer
remedies in this circumstance. The unconscionability doctrine could
be applied in the limited partnership or LLC context. 301 Where a
sophisticated party has improperly taken advantage of another
party at the formation stage, producing an unfair contract, courts
may find the agreement to be unconscionable.
299. See Ribstein, Limited PartnershipAgreements, supra note 6, at 948
("Even clear fiduciary duty waivers do not necessarily cover all potential
fiduciary breaches. Courts understandably hold that conduct outside the
waiver is covered by default fiduciary duties.").
300. See, e.g., SI Mgmt., L.P. v. Winninger, 707 A.2d 37, 43 (Del. 1998); see
also Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, Fiduciary Duties in Delaware
Alternative Entities, 1486 PLI/Corp 383, 412 n.4 (2005).
301. As Robert E. Scott notes, unconscionability doctrine is available to
address firms that seek "to use literal language as a vehicle to exploit
consumers or other 'occasional' contractors." Scott, supra note 184, at 874. For
a development of this theory in the partnership context, see Hynes, supra note
6, at 45 ("In the extraordinary case, relief is available under the doctrine of
unconscionability."), Hynes, supra note 188, at 458-60. See also Ribstein,
UnincorporatedFirms, supra note 6, at 566-67. But cf. Vestal, supra note 32, at
74 (suggesting that it is "inconsistent with the evolution of partnership law ...
to move to an unconscionability standard that would look into the negotiation
phase").
302. Arguably, the unconscionability doctrine will not protect against
bounded rationality and biases when a contract is formed. Cf. Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,47 STAN. L. REV.
211, 252 (1995) ("As in the types of contracts previously considered [fiduciary
waivers], the problem raised by contracts to govern thick relationships is not a
problem of unconscionability. Usually, neither party to such a relationship will
have exploited the other at the time the contract was made. Quite the contrary,
both parties will have probably been subject to exactly the same cognitive
limits."); see also DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes, supra note 6, at 1044-45
(suggesting LLC participants may be unable to identify all the contingencies
that would enable opportunistic conduct). However, the mere existence of
cognitive bias does not mean that paternalism is the appropriate response. The
costs of paternalism must be a factor. As Jeffrey Rachlinski has explained, the
case for paternalism depends upon "demonstrating that the costs of either
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VII. CONTRACTUAL CONSENT AND THE OBJECTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS

Finally, a textualist approach in this context is desirable based
on considerations of individual autonomy. Contractual freedom has
two significant aspects: the freedom to contract; and the freedom
from contract.3 3 Both aspects are implicated by the interpretive
concerns described above. Once it is clear that fiduciary duties are
waived, contractual grants of discretion should be taken literally in
order to increase the likelihood that firm members receive the
bargain they actually intended, and to ensure they may craft an
agreement consistent with their preferred allocation of risks.
One function of a sole discretion term, for example, is to restrict
the role for implied contract terms. An interpretive method that
reads implied obligations into a sole discretion term, even where
fiduciary duties have been eliminated, makes it extremely difficult
to avoid these implied obligations ex ante. And, to the extent the
parties' contract was intended to avoid these very obligations, a
subsequent judicial decision to add them effectively rewrites the
parties' bargain ex post.
In general, autonomy principles do not address the legitimacy of
particular default terms for a contract. 3°4 Assuming that it is
feasible to avoid default terms when an agreement is drafted, the
parties still possess freedom to contract for obligations of their
choice. 5 In many cases, the contracting parties may be deemed to
have given their tacit consent to default terms by drafting an

learning to adopt a superior approach to a choice or relying on others to make a
choice exceeds the cost of paternalistic intervention." See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
The UncertainPsychologicalCase for Paternalism,97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1219
(2003). It is far from obvious that the costs of mandatory substantive limits on
fiduciary waivers are not greater than the costs of opportunism.
303. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 87, at 871 (describing a
"conflict between the two aspects of the liberal conception of contractual

freedom: freedom to contract and freedom from contract" (citing Richard E.
Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract,2 J.L. & COM. 193, 194 (1982)).)
304. See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising,88 MICH. L. REv. 489 (1989).
305. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 87, at 866 ("W]hen the

transaction costs of discovering and contracting around the default rules are
sufficiently low, a party's consent to be legally bound coupled with silence on
the issue in question may well constitute consent to the imposition of the
particular default rule that is in existence in the relevant legal system."); see.
also Goetz & Scott, supra note 213, at 262 (noting that the alleged expansion of
contractual choice that results from standardized implied terms "implicitly
presumes a neutral policy toward individualized agreements: atypical parties
lose nothing, since they remain unrestrained from designing customized
provisions to replace the state-supplied terms").
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agreement against an established interpretive background." 6
Consent to enter into a contract, however, is not the same thing as
consent to every term that a court infers pursuant to that contract.0
Randy Barnett has identified two concerns which are significant
for a court's choice of contractual defaults:
First, we cannot infer from the parties' silence an indirect
consent to a particular default rule from the overall
manifestation of assent to be bound if the parties had no
reason to know of the rule. Second, we cannot infer such
consent if contracting around the rule is so costly that there is
little point in raising the issue in negotiation. I include in the
latter category the cost of uncertain enforcement. 3 8
The freedom to contract is an issue to the extent that a nontextualist rule imposes insurmountable hurdles for parties that seek
expansive managerial discretion-i.e., default terms that are too
costly to avoid. Implied terms raise few concerns for individual
freedom because of their default nature-a fundamental premise of
judicially implied contract terms is the ability of parties to contract
around them.0 9 In contrast, mandatory substantive duties are
inconsistent with the idea that the parties
should be permitted to
3 10
enter into whatever contracts they see fit.

306. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 87, at 865-66 (stating that
many default rules "are legitimated by the silent consent of the parties in much
the same way as evidence law recognizes the possibility that silence in the face
of an accusation can constitute an admission").
307. Id. at 826-27 ("[T]he concept of default rules reveals consent to be
operating at two distinct levels of contract theory. First, the presence of consent
to be legally bound is essential to justify the legal enforcement of any default
rules. Second, nested within this overall consent to be legally bound, consent
also operates to justify the selection of particular default rules.").
308. Id. at 866.
309. This point is noted by default term theorists. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott,
supra note 213, at 262 ("The Expanded Choice thesis [of implied terms]
implicitly presumes a neutral policy toward individualized agreements: atypical
parties lose nothing, since they remain unrestrained from designing customized
provisions to replace the state-supplied terms.").
310. On the importance of consent for the legitimacy of rights transfers, see
Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 238, at 291-300; Barnett, Sound of

Silence, supra note 87, at 829-59. There are arguably some circumstances that
justify exceptions. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87, at 609-10 ("Mandatory
contract law rules ban terms that parties choose; hence, these rules are
inconsistent with the commitment to party sovereignty that we have defended.
The rules nevertheless are justifiable on two grounds. The first is to prevent
externalities, the classic example of which is price fixing. The second ground is
to ameliorate a market failure that disclosure cannot cure."). Neither of
Schwartz and Scott's exceptions is applicable here.
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The members of a limited partnership or LLC are in no position
to inform each other, or the court, of every future contingency that is
to be free from judicial oversight. Thus, an interpretive rule that
mandates transaction-specificity for fiduciary opt-outs also
Permitting parties to
mandates certain substantive results.
announce specific exceptions to implied good faith duties while
simultaneously barring broad grants of discretion effectively
precludes some contract terms that respond to risks of judicial error
or moral hazard.3 '
If a contract's text specifies that the precise activity under
dispute is permitted, it follows that this very conduct was
contemplated by the parties, and is accordingly not in violation of
good faith duties. A similar result should be reached by clearly
describing a broad category of absolute discretion (given an objective
interpretation of "absolute" and "discretion").
The contractual
freedom to carve out broad swaths of non-reviewable conduct
distinguishes a purely contractual regime from one based in
mandatory fiduciary obligation.
A commonsense, textualist understanding of contractual
language also limits the potential for judicially implied terms that
the parties did not agree to, or even anticipate. 3 12 A consent-based
understanding of contract doctrine calls for an objective
interpretation of contractual text. 3
Objective manifestations are
311. The Sonet court apparently recognized this issue. In rejecting the
plaintiffs' efforts to limit the effect of a sole discretion term based on the
contract's failure to expressly expand or limit the General Partner's discretion
in the event of a merger, the court noted that "[tihe problem with Plaintiffs
argument is that it ignores the remainder of the Agreement. It also fails to
recognize the rather practical problem of the impossibility of writing contract
provisions that incorporate every bell and whistle all at once." Sonet v. Timber
Co., 722 A.2d 319, 324 (Del. Ch. 1998).
312. Cf Schwartz & Scott, supra note 87, at 601 (noting, with respect to
default standards, that "firms often need specific guidance regarding the
performance obligation").
313. See generally Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 87, at 874-94.
Others have recognized a link between autonomy and objective interpretations
of contract language. Lon Fuller, for example, connected it to the promotion of
security of transactions. Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 799, 808 (1941) ("The principle of private autonomy, properly understood,
is in no way inconsistent with an 'objective' interpretation of contracts. Indeed,
we may go farther and say that the so-called objective theory of interpretation
in its more extreme applications becomes understandable only in terms of the
principle of private autonomy."). Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of
Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899) ("[Elach party to a
contract has notice that the other will understand his words according to the
usage of the normal speaker of English under the circumstances, and therefore
cannot complain if his words are taken in that sense.").
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crucial to the successful enforceability of contracts, despite the
potential that parties possess an idiosyncratic understanding of
contractual language." 4
Although the actual intentions of the
31
parties matter,
each party must be able to rely on external
evidence of their business partners' consent.316
Default standards that add implied terms to an agreement
(including good faith duties) may comport with concepts of fairness
or efficiency, but they can also redistribute the obligations that exist
within the agreement.3 7 This redistribution implicates the freedom
from contract. When an ex post judicial rewriting of the parties'
agreement occurs, the parties are forced into a relationship not of
their own choosing, with the result that entitlements are transferred
from one party to another without their consent.3 18
A chronic
indeterminacy as to when a contract will be found complete, or what
its implied terms will mean, challenges the legitimacy of the default
concept.
The presumption that parties use language in the same way as
a reasonable reader decreases the likelihood that a court will
interpret the contract in an unanticipated way, thus redistributing
the entitlements set by contract. It also enables parties to easily
avoid the court's interpretation since they can predict how their

314. See Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, supra note 238, at 308 ("A
promisee is not 'justified' in relying on the ordinary meaning of a promisor's
words or deeds where a special meaning can be proved to have been actually
understood by both parties.").
315. See id. at 305 ("A consent analysis is genuinely interested in the actual
intentions of the parties, but we never have direct access to another individual's
subjective mental state.").
316. See id. at 305-07.
317. Cf. Coffee, supra note 5, at 1682 ("If a court later changes the meaning
of [a contractual] term through the use of the hypothetical bargaining approach,
there is a redistributive impact."). The parties to an agreement may have
understood the meaning of a vague contract term even where a court finds it
inefficient. This is an argument against adding an implied term on efficiency
grounds. As Coffee notes, "[olne side loses something for which it may have
bargained; another side may receive a windfall gain." Id.; see also Butler &
Ribstein, supra note 3, at 17 ("The problem is that it is one thing to propound a
default rule to cover situations not covered in the parties' contract, and another
thing to state a general rule applicable irrespective of contract.").
318. Cf Steven J. Burton, Default Principles,Legitimacy, and the Authority
of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 138-39 (1993) ("[I]ndividuals have
no general obligation to do the efficient thing, and it is mysterious why parties
to result-indeterminate contracts might have such obligations when people
generally do not. Even if efficiency justified enforcing deals the parties made,
the justification for enforcing a deal made by the parties is not a justification for
enforcing a deal they did not make.").
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By accepting conventional
agreement will be interpreted.3 19
meanings of words, courts enable sophisticated and unsophisticated
parties alike to assess the scope of their duties °
VIII. CONCLUSION

The creation of nonfiduciary obligations for would-be fiduciaries
places courts in a seemingly unfamiliar position, and courts may
experience a pull toward familiar fiduciary concepts.3 2' Good faith is
the natural instrument for this tendency. A better model is the
business judgment rule, with its tradition of judicial abstention.
Without fiduciary duties, parties are effectively permitted to expand
the effects of the business judgment rule, thus managing the scope
of judicial oversight.
Delaware's contractual duty of good faith is an interpretive
measure, and it is applied cautiously. It is not a means to introduce
mandatory norms of business conduct into limited partnerships and
LLCs that waive fiduciary duties. Instead, good faith duties are a
means to enforce the implicit intentions of the contracting parties,
As a result, explicit text can
as found in their agreement.
dramatically change the content of good faith duties, with a marked
divergence from traditional fiduciary relations.
Contract law enables extensive discretion over business
decisions, up to and including absolute discretion. Accordingly, if a
limited partnership or LLC agreement so indicates, courts should
abstain from reviewing a nonfiduciary's exercise of discretion, even
in cases of gross negligence or self-dealing. There are valid reasons
for investors to desire this level of abstention. Judicial error, moral
319. Cf. Scott, supra note 184, at 860 n.34 ("To be sure, this method of
interpretation will also generate error, in that courts will not complete contracts
in ways that maximize the joint value of the contract to the parties. But this
error is predictable, and thus the parties can anticipate it and use the predicted
and predictable legal outcome as the basis for renegotiating the contract once
Scott notes the availability of renegotiation-the
conditions change.").
predictability of judicial interpretations may also impact negotiations at the
start of the parties' relationship.
320. See Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note 87, at 887 (supporting a
conventionalist default on the following basis: "When one party is rationally
ignorant of the background rules of contract and the other party is not-that is,
the other party is either knowledgeable or irrationally ignorant-default rules
can reduce the instances of subjective disagreements arising between parties
who otherwise are manifesting mutual consent.").
321. Cf.DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes, supra note 5, at 1062 ("Many brave
new worlds, as they age, strongly resemble prior institutions. My prediction is
that doctrines to control opportunistic conduct in LLCs will evolve toward
results that resemble present doctrine developed prior to the LLC
phenomenon.").
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hazard, and the fear of overcautious business decisions all support
broad fiduciary opt-outs.
Boundaries still exist for nonfiduciary relations, even in cases
where an agreement vests management with absolute discretion
over business decisions. Claims of fraud, misappropriation of assets,
or waste should still be viable in most cases where firms have
stripped away fiduciary duties, as these actions would not be
contemplated by members of a limited partnership or LLC. In
comparison to fiduciary obligation, however, the restrictions are
minimal.
The recent statutory amendments in Delaware are historic for
expressly allowing the creation of business relationships governed
entirely by traditional contract law: firms may exist without any
residual fiduciary duty. Any remaining obligations are therefore
found in contract doctrine, with its emphasis on individual freedom.
Pursuant to fiduciary duties, courts are responsible for enforcing
broad standards of business conduct, but contract law does not
mandate these standards; the proper concern when interpreting a
contract is to enforce the agreement as written.

